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The Exclusion of Non-English-Speaking Jurors:
Remedying a Century of Denial of the Sixth
Amendment in the Federal Courts
of Puerto Rico
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the constitutional implications of the Jury Selection
and Service Act’s English language juror prerequisite, as applied in the federal
courts in Puerto Rico.  The language requirement results in the exclusion of
approximately 90% of the age-eligible population of Puerto Rico from federal
jury service and disproportionately excludes Puerto Ricans of color and the
poor.  I argue that application of the language requirement in Puerto Rico vio-
lates monolingual Spanish speakers’ fundamental Sixth Amendment right to a
jury selected from a fair cross section of the community in federal criminal pro-
ceedings.  I also examine the English language juror prerequisite under the Pu-
erto Rican Federal Relations Act and offer a new test to determine the local
applicability of not just this language requirement, but all federal statutes to
Puerto Rico.  This examination is contextualized in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Insular Cases and extraterritorial application of the Constitution, as well as the
intrinsically linked relationship between language, political status, and citizen-
ship in Puerto Rico.  Ultimately, I advocate for the implementation of a juror
language accommodation program modeled after the New Mexico state courts.
INTRODUCTION
“That juror looks like a defendant!” exclaimed a genuinely surprised
veteran court employee in hushed tones as the juror passed through the
courthouse’s inner corridor leading to a jury room.  After clerking for the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico for two years, her
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is dedicated to Judge Damon J. Keith of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, whose
undying commitment to “Equal Justice under Law” has inspired me and generations.  I would
like to thank Rachel Moran, Laura Gómez, Ruben Garcia, Roy Brooks, Angelo Ancheta, Les-
lie Wallace, Nancy Kim, and Andrea Freeman for their comments on earlier drafts of this
Article, as well as my student research assistants Sadaf Tajzoy, Alex Kannan, Karen Suri, and
Nick Colla.  I also thank the faculty of California Western School of Law, as well as the
panelists and participants at: LatCrit XV (especially Pedro Malavet and José “Beto” Juárez);
2010 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting; and the Fourth Annual UCLA Critical
Race Studies Symposium, which offered invaluable feedback in response to my presentations
of this and related material.  Finally, I am deeply grateful to Judge Héctor M. Laffitte for
providing me with an exceptional practical legal education during my clerkship with the
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meaning was unquestionably and disturbingly clear:  she was referring to the
fact that the juror was black.  Although black Puerto Ricans and other Lati-
nos of African descent regularly appeared as criminal defendants in this fed-
eral court, black jurors were rare.1
Historically, the majority of Puerto Rican residents have been prohib-
ited from serving as federal jurors due to the federal procedural rule requir-
ing jurors to speak, read, and write in English.2  For the more than a century
that the United States has claimed Puerto Rico as a territory and operated
federal courts on the island,3 federal juries have not been “a body truly rep-
resentative of the community”4 in several respects.  Because less than a
quarter of the population of Puerto Rico speaks English, and even fewer
speak English at an advanced level that would allow them to serve on a jury,
an estimated 90% of Puerto Rico’s citizenry is denied the privilege and re-
sponsibility of serving on federal juries.5
Furthermore, in Puerto Rico the ability to speak the English language is
highly correlated with a privileged socioeconomic background.  Unfortu-
nately, black Latinos and other Puerto Ricans of color come disproportion-
ately from lower socioeconomic classes, and thus tend to not speak English.
As such, English language ability in Puerto Rico often acts as a proxy for
race, color, class, and educational level.  This means the bulk of black Lati-
nos, Puerto Ricans of color, the poor, and under-educated are excluded from
the jury pool.  Federal jurors in Puerto Rico therefore end up coming from
socioeconomic, educational, racial, and color backgrounds that do not reflect
the general population.
This Article contends that the English language mandate, as applied in
Puerto Rico, deprives monolingual (and functionally monolingual) Spanish
speakers of their Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a fair cross-
section of the community in federal criminal proceedings.  By way of back-
ground, Part I provides an overview of the establishment of a federal court in
Puerto Rico, the development of the English language juror prerequisite, and
the use of English by the people of Puerto Rico.
1 This assertion comes from observations by judicial law clerks clerking for the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico from August 2004 to August 2008.  Al-
though anecdotal evidence supports the assertion that black Latinos are overrepresented as
federal criminal defendants but disproportionately excluded as jurors, there has been no study
into this phenomenon.  As such, no empirical data is available at this time.
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (2006); Act of June 25, 1906, Pub. L. No. 294, ch. 3542, 34
Stat. 466 (defining the qualification of jurors in the United States District Court for Puerto
Rico); Organic Act of 1917 (Jones Act), ch. 145, § 44, 39 Stat. 966 (1917) (repealed 1968).
3 Although at times I will refer to Puerto Rico in common speech as “the island,” the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is in fact composed of a group of islands.
4 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
5 Hyon B. Shin & Rosalind Bruno, Language Use and English-Speaking Ability:  2000,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU BRIEF, Oct. 2003, at 5, www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf
(reporting that the 2000 Census found 71.9% of residents of Puerto Rico “[s]poke English
less than ‘very well’”); Elı́as R. Gutiérrez, Discrimination in Federal Court (Sept. 4, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://graduados.uprrp.edu/planificacion/facultad/elias-
gutierrez/FederalJuryPR%5B1%5D.pdf.
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Part II examines the legal and political foundations that have contrib-
uted to a century of deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
selected from a fair cross section of the community in Puerto Rico.  This
examination focuses on the federal government’s long-standing refusal to
allow Puerto Rico the right of self-governance and Puerto Rican citizens the
right to participate in the important self-governance activities of voting and
jury service in the federal system.  Central to this discussion are the United
States Supreme Court’s Insular Cases, which sanctioned colonialism and de-
veloped the doctrine of extraterritorial application of the Constitution to U.S.
territories.6  Initially, this series of opinions withheld application of the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury in Puerto Rico outright,7 and later—as this
Article contends—established a legal and political landscape for second-
class citizenship status and continued inferior Sixth Amendment protections
for residents of Puerto Rico, especially for black Latinos, other persons of
color, and the poor.
Part III examines the constitutionality of the English language juror re-
quirement.  This analysis focuses on the Sixth Amendment and argues that
monolingual Spanish speakers in Puerto Rico are a distinct group, unfairly
and systematically excluded from federal jury service, and thus can establish
a fair-cross-section violation under Duren v. Missouri.8  This conclusion is
supported by examination of the original purposes behind the fair-cross-sec-
tion requirement.  Finally, the Article refutes the argument of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that, although application of the
English language qualification in Puerto Rico may constitute a prima facie
fair-cross-section violation, the federal government’s interest in conducting
proceedings in English justifies the language requirement.
Part IV sets forth a statutory argument for why application of the En-
glish language juror requirement in Puerto Rico is inappropriate and should
be abolished.  The Article argues that the English language requirement
should be found locally inapplicable in Puerto Rico under the Puerto Rican
6 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
289 (1901) (White, J., concurring); Ediberto Román, Reparations and the Colonial Dilemma:
The Insurmountable Hurdles and Yet Transformative Benefits, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J.
369, 380–81 (2002).
7 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13 (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not apply in Puerto
Rico because only fundamental rights apply in an unincorporated territory like Puerto Rico and
Sixth Amendment rights were not recognized as fundamental rights).  The Sixth Amendment
rights to an impartial jury (which includes the right to a jury selected from a fair cross section
of the community), right to counsel, and right to confront witnesses have since been deemed
fundamental rights by the Court.  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (fair-cross-section
requirement is a fundamental right); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to a jury
trial is a fundamental right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel is a
fundamental right).  Thus modernly, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a fair
cross section of the community likely applies in Puerto Rico. See, e.g., United States v. De La
Paz-Rentas, 613 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Angulo-Hernandez, 565 F.3d 2,
12 (1st Cir. 2009).
8 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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Federal Relations Act of 1952.9  The Article critiques the current juridical
approach to statutory construction under the “not locally inapplicable”10
clause of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act and proposes an alternative
test.  Further, the Article advocates that, irrespective of whether the courts
would find the Jury Selection and Service Act’s (“JSSA”) language prereq-
uisite applicable to Puerto Rico, Congress should exempt Puerto Rico from
the requirement pursuant to its plenary power under the Territories Clause of
the Constitution.11
Part V proposes a solution to the juror-exclusion dilemma.  This pre-
scriptive analysis focuses on a comparative examination of New Mexico
state courts where interpreters are provided to non-English-speaking jurors
and, to a lesser degree, sign language interpretation accommodation.  This
Article proposes a combination of simultaneous and consecutive interpreta-
tion and translation to enable non-English-speaking citizens to serve on fed-
eral juries in Puerto Rico.  This proposal, although not without some
administrative costs, would accommodate the federal government’s interests
in conducting judicial proceedings in English and preserving an English re-
cord for appellate review, while ensuring a representative juror pool and
equal access to the federal courts.  This offers a practical and viable frame-
work that can be applied beyond the shores of Puerto Rico to courts across
the nation located in jurisdictions with large populations of non-English-
speaking citizens.
I. ENGLISH IN PUERTO RICO AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
In order to fully understand the constitutional implications of the man-
date that all federal jurors in Puerto Rico must be proficient in the English
language, it is necessary to review:  (a) the establishment of the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico and its unilateral imposi-
tion of English language requirements; (b) the JSSA’s English language juror
prerequisite; and (c) the historical and contemporary use of English by the
people of Puerto Rico.
A. Establishment of the Court and its English-Only Requirements
In June of 1898, near the conclusion of the brief Spanish-American
War, the United States invaded Puerto Rico and promptly set up a military
government.12  Approximately six months later, Spain officially ceded Pu-
erto Rico (as well as the Philippines, Cuba, and Guam) to the United States
9 48 U.S.C. § 734 (2006).
10 Id.
11 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
12 See generally FRANK FREIDEL, THE SPLENDID LITTLE WAR (1958); DAVID F. TRASK,
THE WAR WITH SPAIN IN 1898 (1981).
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through the Treaty of Paris.13  In 1900, in an effort to establish a temporary
civil government in Puerto Rico, the United States Congress enacted the
Organic Act of 1900, more commonly known as the “Foraker Act.”14  The
Foraker Act established Puerto Rico as a territory belonging to the United
States, but denied American citizenship to Puerto Ricans.15  In addition to
denying Puerto Rico sovereignty outright, the Act ensured that although Pu-
erto Ricans could participate in the colonial government in a limited way,
they could not have a determinative effect over the island’s governance.16
Furthermore, Puerto Ricans were not granted any representation in Congress
or the right to vote for president, a deprivation of political rights that contin-
ues to this day.17
In the very same breath as denying sovereignty and U.S. citizenship to
the people of Puerto Rico, the Foraker Act established the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.18  This court took over for the
U.S. provisional military court that had been in existence since shortly after
invasion.19  The District Court of Puerto Rico mirrored its mainland federal
counterparts and had jurisdiction to hear similar matters as other federal
courts.20  Like the legislative and executive branches of the government, the
judicial branch was also predominately governed without Puerto Rican in-
volvement.  All key officers of the court (such as the district judge, U.S.
Attorney, and U.S. Marshal) were appointed to four-year terms by the presi-
dent with Senate ratification, and without any Puerto Rican representation or
input.21
With the political conquest complete, efforts at a cultural takeover or
“Americanization” were deployed.  The primary strategy in this plan of as-
similation was English-only requirements. This campaign was primarily
targeted on two fronts:  public affairs—most notably the federal courts—and
13 Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, art. 2, 30 Stat. 1754, 1775 [hereinafter
Treaty of Paris].
14 Organic Act of 1900 (Foraker Act), ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (repealed 1917).
15 Id. § 7.  In this Article, I will use the term “Puerto Ricans” to refer to persons who are
both residents of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and ethnically Puerto Rican.
16 See id.  For instance, the governor of Puerto Rico was to be appointed by the President
of the United States and ratified by the Senate rather than by election by the people of the
jurisdiction. Id. § 17.  Further, the cabinet was also to be appointed by the president and
ratified by the Senate, and Puerto Ricans could occupy only five of the eleven cabinet seats.
Id. § 18.
17 Puerto Rico’s only representative in the federal system is a resident commissioner who
has no voting privileges. See 48 U.S.C. § 891 (2006); Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The
Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Re-
considered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1163 (2009).
18 Foraker Act § 34; see generally GUILLERMO A. BARALT, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
COURT IN PUERTO RICO: 1899–1999 (Andrés Palomares ed., Janis Palma trans.) (2004) (pro-
viding the most complete history of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico available to date).  Initially the court was misnamed the District Court for “Porto Rico.”
19 Foraker Act § 33.
20 Id. § 34; BARALT, supra note 18, at 116. R
21 Foraker Act § 34.
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the education system.”22  Despite the fact that close to none of the island’s
inhabitants spoke English,23 all proceedings of the court were required to be
conducted in English.24  Subsequently, judicially prescribed local rules pro-
vided “that all pleadings, . . . motions, and proceedings were to be in En-
glish” and that “documents were to be translated into English when
necessary.”25
In 1906, Congress issued “An Act Defining the qualification of jurors
for service in the United States district court in Porto Rico.”26  This act spec-
ified, among other things, that all jurors “have . . . a sufficient knowledge of
the English language to enable [them] to duly serve as . . . juror[s.]”27  The
second Organic Act, the Jones Act of 1917, granted Puerto Ricans U.S. citi-
zenship and required that all district court jurors “have a sufficient knowl-
edge of the English language to enable [them] to serve as juror[s].”28  The
Jones Act’s English language requirement remained in force for over fifty
years until it was replaced in 1968 by the JSSA’s “qualifications for jury
service.”29
B. The Jury Selection and Service Act’s English Language Requirement
The JSSA applies to all federal district courts and delineates the prereq-
uisites for federal jury service, including a language requirement.30  The
JSSA states, in relevant part, that a person is not qualified for jury service in
any federal court if he or she does not speak English or “is unable to read,
write, and understand the English language with a degree of proficiency suf-
ficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form . . . .”31  The JSSA
English language requirement has been held to apply to the United States
District Court for Puerto Rico.32  As discussed in more detail below, the
JSSA was enacted to establish a uniform jury selection process in an effort
22 As Judge Peter J. Hamilton, the sixth district judge to serve in the District of Puerto
Rico, observed, “‘the public schools and the federal court are the two educational forces for
Americanization on the island.’”  José A. Cabranes, Judging in Puerto Rico and Elsewhere,
FED. LAW., June 2002, at 40, 42 (quoting Richard Graffam, The Federal Courts’ Interpretation
of Puerto Rican Law: Whose Law Is It, Anyway?, 47 REV. COL. ABOG. P.R. 111, 113 n.4
(1986)).
23 See José Julián Alvarez González, Law, Language and Statehood: The Role of English
in the Great State of Puerto Rico, 17 LAW & INEQ. 359, 363 (1999).
24 Foraker Act § 34 (“All pleadings and proceedings . . . shall be conducted in the English
language.”).
25 BARALT, supra note 18, at 121. R
26 Act of June 25, 1906, Pub. L. No. 294, ch. 3542, 34 Stat. 466 (defining the qualification
of jurors for service in the United States District Court for Puerto Rico).
27 Id.
28 Organic Act of 1917 (Jones Act), ch. 145, § 44, 39 Stat. 966 (1917) (repealed 1968).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (2006).
30 Id.
31 Id. § 1865(b)(1)–(3).
32 See United States v. De La Paz-Rentas, 613 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v.
Dubon-Otero, 292 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d 483,
492 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 19–20 (1st Cir. 1981); Alicia
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to ensure that jury pools are drawn from a “fair cross section of the commu-
nity”33 and that “[n]o citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or
petit juror in the [federal courts] on account of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or economic status.”34  Paradoxically, despite the JSSA’s
purported anti-discrimination purposes, application of the JSSA language re-
quirement in Puerto Rico systematically discriminates against many of the
very same population groups that the statute was designed to protect and
ensures that both grand and petit juries are not selected from a fair cross
section of the community.35
C. The Federal Jury Selection Process in Puerto Rico
Section 1863 of the JSSA provides that “[e]ach United States district
court shall devise and place into operation a written plan for random selec-
tion of grand and petit jurors that shall be designed to achieve [the fair-
cross-section and non-discrimination policies of the JSSA].”36  In conform-
ity with § 1863, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico enacted the Amended Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and
Petit Jurors Pursuant to the Jury Selection and Service Act of 196837 (“Jury
Plan”).  There are several administrative steps required to select a jury under
the Jury Plan.  First, the Clerk of the Court maintains a “Master Jury
Wheel”38 by randomly selecting names of registered voters from the Com-
monwealth State Elections Commission every four years, following each
election.39  The number of names selected must amount to at least five-tenths
of one percent (0.5%) of voters from the most recent election.40  To ensure
that the voting precincts (and by extension, geographical places of residence)
are proportionally represented, the names are chosen through a stratified
sampling process.41  After the Clerk of Court determines the number of
names needed to maintain the Master Jury Wheel, this number is juxtaposed
against the total number of registered voters resulting in a selection quo-
Pousada, The Mandatory Use of English in the Federal Court of Puerto Rico, 20 CENTRO J.
136 (2008).
33 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006).
34 Id. § 1862.
35 See infra Part III.A.
36 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a).
37  Id. (providing that each district court must enact a jury plan in accordance with the
JSSA).  The District for Puerto Rico’s plan, Amended Plan for the Random Selection of Grand
and Petit Jurors Pursuant to the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, as Amended (Feb. 22,
1982) [hereinafter Jury Plan], is available at http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/CourtWeb/pdf/jury/
Amended_Jury_Plan.pdf.
38 Jury Plan, supra note 37, § 10(A). R
39 Elı́as R. Gutiérrez, Analysis and Evaluation of the Fairness Resulting from the Jury
Selection Processes in the Federal District Court of Puerto Rico 2 (Sept. 2001) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://graduados.uprrp.edu/planificacion/facultad/elias-gutierrez/
ERGJurySelection.pdf).
40 Jury Plan, supra note 37, §§ 10(A), 10(B)(2). R
41 Id. § 10(B).
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tient.42  Following a determination of the quotient, a starting number is man-
ually drawn.43  The names of the selected voters are then input into the Jury
Management System, which randomly selects names of people who will be
issued questionnaires.44
The Clerk of the Court then mails the selected individuals a Juror Quali-
fication Questionnaire and instructions.45  Returned Juror Qualification
Questionnaires are then preliminarily screened for eligibility.46  If a form
indicates that the individual does not meet the minimum-age, U.S. citizen-
ship, or English language requirements, the form is removed from considera-
tion.47  The remaining individuals are placed on a “Qualified Jury Wheel”
and summoned to a jury orientation session where individuals are questioned
to determine their English language ability.48  Jurors who cannot “read,
write, speak, and understand the English language with a degree of profi-
ciency sufficient to satisfactorily complete the Juror Qualification Form and
to render satisfactory jury service in [the] Court” are excluded.49
D. English in Puerto Rico
1. The Official Language Acts: Making Puerto Rico Officially
Bilingual
For most of its history as a territory or commonwealth of the United
States, both Spanish and English have been the official languages of Puerto
Rico.  At the time the United States conquered Puerto Rico, Spanish had
been the sole language of the vast majority of the island’s population for four
centuries.50  One of the first official acts under U.S. colonial rule was to
declare English as one of the official languages of Puerto Rico.  The Lan-
guage Act of 1902 provided:
In all the departments of the Commonwealth Government and in
all the courts of this island, and in all public offices the English
42 Id. § 10(B)(3) (“The quotient is the ratio of selected to unselected names.  For example
if the Clerk should determine that to supply court jury requirements for four years, it will need
20,000 names, and if there are a total of 2,200,000 on the consolidated list of registered voters,
the ‘quotient’ to be used would be 2,200,000/20,000 or 110; therefore, the Clerk would take
every 110th registered voter’s name for the Master Jury Wheel.”).
43 Id. § 10(B)(4).
44 Id. § 10(B)(5).
45 Id.; Gutiérrez, supra note 39, at 2. R
46 Jury Plan, supra note 37, § 10(B)(5).  For an example of the questionnaire, see United R
States District Court, Sample Jury Qualification Questionnaire, Custom Form No. F-15467,
available at http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/CourtWeb/pdf/jury/QualificationQuestionnaireWith
Instructions.pdf; see also Gutiérrez, supra note 39, at 2. R
47 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (2006); Gutiérrez, supra note 39, at 2. R
48 Gutiérrez, supra note 39, at 2. R
49 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b); Jury Plan, supra note 37, § 6(A) (emphasis added). R
50 Ennio M. Colón et al., Founding of a Mixed Legal System, 32 REV. JUR. U. INTER. P.R.
232, 242 (1998).
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language and the Spanish language shall be used indiscriminately;
and, when necessary, translations and oral interpretations shall be
made from one language to the other so that all parties interested
may understand any proceedings or communications made
therein.51
This Act remained in place until 1991 when the pro-commonwealth Popular
Democratic Party (“PDP”) passed a bill making Spanish the Common-
wealth’s only official language.52  The Spanish-only law was short-lived and
quickly replaced in 1993 by a pro-statehood New Progressive Party bill rein-
stating English as one of the official languages of the Commonwealth.53  The
1993 Language Act also provides that: “When necessary, written transla-
tions and oral interpretations shall be made from one language to the other
so that the interested parties can understand any proceeding or communica-
tion in said languages.”54
Thus, aside from a brief hiatus under the 1991 Act, Puerto Rico has
been officially bilingual for over a century.  However, as the Puerto Rico
legislature noted in passing the Spanish-only law of 1991, Puerto Rico is “a
homogeneous cultural and linguistic society,”55 where Spanish is king.  This
is one rare point of agreement in the highly contentious political environ-
ment of Puerto Rico.  The three primary political parties are distinguished
primarily by their stance on Puerto Rico’s political status, advocating for
enhanced commonwealth status, statehood, or independence.56  One of the
only issues on which all the parties agree is that Spanish is the language of
the people of Puerto Rico.57  “Puerto Rico is a monolingual society where
Spanish reigns and English plays an absolutely minor role.”58  There is one
notable exception:  the federal court.
51 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1, § 51 (repealed 1991).
52 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1, § 56 (repealed 1993) (“It is hereby declared and established that
Spanish shall be the official language of Puerto Rico to be used in all its departments, munici-
palities, or other political subdivisions, agencies, offices and government dependencies of the
Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”).
53 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1, § 59 (1993) (“Spanish and English are established as official
languages of the Government of Puerto Rico.  Both languages may be used, indistinctively, in
all departments, municipalities or other political subdivisions, agencies, public corporations,
offices and government dependencies of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches of
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico . . . .”).
54 Id.
55 Statement of Motives, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1, § 56 (repealed 1993).
56 Johnny Smith, Commonwealth Status: A Good Deal for Puerto Rico?, 10 HARV. LA-
TINO L. REV. 263, 271 (2007) (“The three major political parties of Puerto Rico are structured
around the major points of view on the status debate.  As its name suggests, the Puerto Rican
Independence Party (“PIP”) supports independence. The New Progressive Party (“NPP”) fa-
vors statehood.  The Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”) supports maintaining some form of
commonwealth status.”).
57 See Edelmira L. Nickels, English in Puerto Rico, 24 WORLD ENGLISHES 227, 228
(2005).
58 Alvarez González, supra note 23, at 360. R
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2. Political and Personal Resistance to English as an Effort toward
Preservation of Cultural Identity and Cultural Sovereignty
The battle for and against colonization in Puerto Rico has often been
fought over language.  The mandated use of English in Puerto Rico has been
highly controversial and subject to organized and individual resistance.  No
combat zone has been more bombarded than the arena of public education.59
In an attempt to “Americanize”60 Puerto Ricans, the United States initially
implemented English as the language of instruction in the public schools.61
Consequently, “[i]n the eyes of many Islanders, Puerto Rican classrooms
became the battlefield where the war against English, or specifically ‘Ameri-
canization’ was fought.”62  The goal of the federal government was to make
Puerto Ricans bilingual within a generation, namely through the public
schools.63  These labors were met with conflict.  In the mid-1930s, Puerto
Rican political leaders and educators, who linked language with political and
cultural autonomy, began to actively oppose instruction in English.64  After
vigorous efforts by these groups, Spanish became the official language of
instruction in the public schools in 1949.65
Over sixty years later, public schools at all grade levels are still taught
exclusively in Spanish,66 with English used only in second or foreign lan-
guage classes.67  Public school teachers are often opposed to English or bi-
lingual instruction in the classroom.68  This is not surprising since the
Teachers’ Association of Puerto Rico, of which virtually all public school
59 Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 1, 67–70 (2000).
60 Amı́lcar Antonio Barreto, Speaking English in Puerto Rico:  The Impact of Affluence,
Education and Return Migration, 7 CENTRO J. 5, 6 (2000).
61 Amı́lcar Antonio Barreto, Statehood, the English Language, and the Politics of Educa-
tion, 34 POLITY 89, 90 (2001).
62 Nickels, supra note 57, at 229. R
63 Id.; Arnold Leibowitz, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico:  Trying to Gain Dignity and
Maintain Culture, 11 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 211, 228 (1981) (quoting letter from Franklin D.
Roosevelt to José M. Gallardo (Apr. 17, 1937), reprinted in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE CONSTITUTION PREVAILS, 1937, at 160–61 (1941)).
64 Nickels, supra note 57, at 229 (quoting EDITH ALGREN DE GUTIÉRREZ, THE MOVEMENT R
AGAINST TEACHING ENGLISH IN SCHOOLS IN PUERTO RICO 10 (1987)); see also Barreto, supra
note 60, at 6. R
65 Erna Kerkhof, The Myth of the Dumb Puerto Rican: Circular Migration and Language
Struggle in Puerto Rico, 75 NEW W. INDIAN GUIDE 257, 259 (2001); see also Barreto, supra
note 61, at 89. R
66 See Arlene Clachar, Ethnolinguistic Identity and Spanish Proficiency in a Paradoxical
Situation:  The Case of Puerto Rican Return Migrants, 18 J. MULTILINGUAL & MULTICUL-
TURAL DEV. 107, 108 (1997).
67 See Alicia Pousada, The Competent Bilingual in Puerto Rico, 142 INT’L. J. SOC. LAN-
GUAGE 103, 103 (2000).
68 See Barreto, supra note 60, at 6 (“Studies show that to this day teachers in Puerto Rico R
still harbor a strong cultural resistance towards the United States and much of that resistance is
aimed at the teaching of the English language.  Teachers of English as a second language are
often viewed as agents promoting cultural defection despite the recognition that knowledge of
English is a marketable skill.”); Kerkhof, supra note 65, at 281. R
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teachers are members, was founded in 1911 with the express purpose of
undoing English education.69  A movement that began as an effort to reinsti-
tute Spanish language instruction in the public schools eventually developed
into a movement against English.70
Puerto Rican cultural identity is deeply rooted not only in the Spanish
language, but also in resistance to English language teaching and acquisi-
tion.71  “Beyond its role as a medium of communication, the Spanish lan-
guage in Puerto Rico also serves as a cultural trait intimately tied to
contemporary cultural identity.”72  For most Puerto Ricans, the Spanish lan-
guage is the most important characteristic of Puerto Rican cultural identity.73
There is a prevalent belief in Puerto Rico that bilingualism can be a serious
threat to one’s puertoriqueñidad or “Puertoricanness,” and that learning En-
glish can result in the unlearning of Spanish, which is synonymous with loss
of culture.74  Since “Puerto Rico has never been a nation in the sense of a
politically independent state; in the Puerto Rican context nation means a
distinct cultural-linguistic unit.”75  As such, the defense of Spanish and defi-
ance of English have been means to maintain national and cultural identity,
as well as fight for a sense of sovereignty.
A pull between the cultural value of Spanish and economic value of
English creates a quandary.  There is a widely-shared sentiment that English
diminishes Puerto Rican identity and is a threat to Hispanic culture, but no
one disputes that English is necessary for socioeconomic mobility.76  In other
words, “English is seen as a marker of ‘out group’ membership; however, it
is also a valued skill.”77  Bilingual Puerto Ricans simply have better job and
economic prospects than those who do not speak English.78  English ability
then becomes a “symbol of class differentiation,”79 and like most badges of
the elite class, it is difficult to obtain.  The English taught in public school as
a second or foreign language is limited in quantity and quality.  Rather than
69 Kerkhof, supra note 65, at 267 n.8. R
70 See id. at 268 (citing ALGREN DE GUTIERREZ, supra note 64); Melvyn Resnick, ESL and R
Language Planning in Puerto Rican Education, 27 TESOL Q. 259, 265 (1993).
71 See Alicia Pousada, On the Horns of a Language Planning Dilemma, 30 TESOL Q.
499, 500 (Fall 1996); Pousada, supra note 32, at 144; Resnick, supra note 70. R
72 Barreto, supra note 61, at 90. R
73 See generally Pousada, supra note 32, at 139. R
74 Erwin H. Epstein, National Identity and the Language Issue in Puerto Rico, 11 COMP.
EDUC. REV. 133, 137 (1967); William C. Schweers & Jorge A. Vélez, To Be or Not To Be
Bilingual in Puerto Rico: That Is the Issue, 2 TESOL Q. 23, 26–27 (Autumn 1992).
75 Eugene V. Mohr, Language, Literature and Journalism, in THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IN
PUERTO RICO 135, 137 (Lynn-Darrell Bender ed., 1998).
76 See, e.g., Barreto, supra note 60, at 7; Kerkhof, supra note 65; Pousada, supra note 32, R
at 138 (“Viewed simultaneously as a tool of economic advancement and an instrument of
ideological repression, English is perceived by many Puerto Ricans as a necessary evil that
poses a threat to Spanish and Puerto Rican culture.”); Pousada, supra note 71, at 500; Resnick, R
supra note 70, at 271; Schweers & Vélez, supra note 74, at 23–26. R
77 Barreto, supra note 60, at 5. R
78 Nickels, supra note 57, at 234 (“English-speaking skills highly and positively correlate R
with income level.”).
79 Id. at 230; see also Kerkhof, supra note 65, at 269. R
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teaching Standard English, linguists have observed that “Spanglish” or “En-
glañol” (an informal hybrid of Spanish and English) is taught.80  As a result,
despite mandatory English language courses in schools, most high school
graduates do not speak English or only do so poorly.81  Moreover, a signifi-
cant number of Puerto Ricans from the lower socioeconomic strata do not
even get the benefit of this limited instruction in English due to the high
level of school attrition, particularly among the poor.  At least 40% of adults
residing in Puerto Rico do not have a high school education.82  This is an
educational attrition rate two times higher than the U.S. average.83  In Puerto
Rico, like in the United States, low socioeconomic class is highly correlated
with low-level educational attainment and not completing compulsory levels
of school.84
Conversely, wealthier Puerto Ricans enroll their children in expensive
private schools where English is the language of instruction.85  These more
affluent families also tend to send their children to college in the United
States.86  Thus, the positive correlation between English language ability and
higher socioeconomic status is continually perpetuated.  The upper echelons
speak English, these skills result in higher income, and this wealth allows
their children’s continued matriculation in English language private schools.
Meanwhile, the lower-middle class and poor have no choice but to study at
public schools, which do not provide an adequate English education.87
80 See Rose Nash, Englañol: More Language Contact in Puerto Rico, 46 AM. SPEECH 106,
121 (1971); Rose Nash, Spanglish: Language Contact in Puerto Rico, 45 AM. SPEECH 223
(1970).
81 Kerkhof, supra note 64, at 257. R
82 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, EDUC. ATTAINMENT OF 2000 IN PU-
ERTO RICO (finding only 60% of residents of Puerto Rico 25 years or older had at least a high
school education).
83 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, EDUC. ATTAINMENT OF 2000 IN THE
UNITED STATES (finding 80.4% of U.S. residents 25 years or older had at least a high school
education).
84 See generally Neil Allison & Arthur MacEwan, Students Dropping Out of Puerto Rico
Public Schools Measuring the Problem and Examining the Implications 2 (2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://economia.uprrp.edu/ensayo%20125.pdf.
85 See Barreto, supra note 60, at 7; Barreto, supra note 61, at 95 (discussing how private R
schools continued to teach in English after Spanish became the language instruction in public
schools, but these “schools charge tuition rates beyond the reach of ordinary Puerto Ricans”);
Kerkhof, supra note 65, at 269; Pousada, supra note 32, at 139; Schweers & Vélez, supra note R
74, at 27–28 (stating that most middle- and upper-class families in Puerto Rico send their R
children to private schools).
86 Barreto, supra note 60, at 7. R
87 There is one smaller demographic group in Puerto Rico that does not fit the general
pattern that English ability is correlated with class.  Puerto Rican return immigrants (individu-
als originally from Puerto Rico who immigrated to the U.S. mainland and later returned) and
their children often speak English but are low income.  However, this group is not representa-
tive of the general community excluded from the federal jury pool. See Clachar, supra note
66, at 109 (stating that Puerto Rican return migrants “have lifestyles, social behaviors, and R
cultural values which are at variance with those of island-raised Puerto Ricans . . . [Further,]
no single distinctive characteristic appears to polarise [sic] the two groups more than lan-
guage”).  Although both groups would generally have some proficiency in Spanish and use
Spanish in “all domains” of life, these groups “represent two different ethnic groups in Puerto
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3. Use of English by the People of Puerto Rico
Despite the fact that Puerto Rico is officially bilingual, the majority of
Puerto Ricans do not speak English.  Studies generally indicate that only 20
to 28% of the population of Puerto Rico speaks English.88  These statistics,
particularly the census data, may be inflated because they are conducted in
Spanish and survey-takers may tend to overstate their English language abil-
ities.89  When considering English ability in the context of jury service,
rather than casual conversation, the level of the language skill is particularly
important.  In the 2000 census a mere 17.6% of the population aged 18 or
older indicated they spoke English very well.90  It is estimated that less than
10% of adult Puerto Ricans speak English at a level adequate for service on
a federal jury.91
Research by Professor Elı́as R. Gutiérrez, of the University of Puerto
Rico, concludes that 91% of the jury-age-eligible population of the Com-
monwealth is excluded under the English language requirement.92  Professor
Gutiérrez’s research further reveals that not only does the language require-
ment “systematically discriminate[ ] against the majority of the resident
population of Puerto Rico,” it systematically excludes persons of lower in-
come and education, as well as women.93
English proficiency requirement for jury service in Puerto Rico
biases selection against low-income groups and works systemi-
cally against that portion (86.9%) of males that receive 20.8% of
the income and that portion (95%) of women that receive 17% of
the income.  Thus, on the basis of a seemingly neutral criterion,
the selection process is systematically excluding from jury service
91% of the population that would otherwise qualify by age.  The
English proficiency criterion ultimately constitutes an unallowable
economic status filter.94
Rico.  The state of affairs gives rise to an interethnic situation . . . in which language is a
distinctive characteristic of membership in each of these two ethnic groups, a significant di-
mension for interethnic categorization, and the medium for facilitating intragroup cohesion.”
Id.; see also Pousada, supra note 32, at 139 (“Often [return migrants] are not considered to be R
‘real Puerto Ricans’ by island residents and may be criticized for their limited Spanish profi-
ciency or their use of non-standard varieties of English.”).
88 Shin & Bruno, supra note 5, at 2 (reporting that the 2000 Census found 71.9% of
residents of Puerto Rico “[s]poke English less than ‘very well’”); Resnick, supra note 69, at R
259 (noting that “some 80% of the population remains functionally monolingual in Spanish”).
89 Alvarez González, supra note 23, at 368. R
90 Pousada, supra note 32, at 138; Shin & Bruno, supra note 5, at 2. R
91 Se discrimina al usar el inglés en algunos tribunals de Puerto Rico?,
NYDAILYNEWS.COM, Feb. 24, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/latino/espanol/2009/02/25/
2009-02-25_se_discrimina_al_usar_el_ingls_en_alguno-2.html?page=1 (stating that pursuant
to a University of Puerto Rico study, more than nine out of every ten Puerto Ricans cannot
speak English at an advanced level and accordingly cannot participate in federal juries).
92 Gutiérrez, supra note 5. R
93 Id. at 2–3.
94 Id. at 3.
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As “[t]here is a strong statistical correlation between higher social class and
superior English proficiency,”95 the jury pool is composed of Puerto Ricans
from upper educational, economic, and social backgrounds and is not repre-
sentative of the community.96
Further, since socioeconomic status correlates closely with race in Pu-
erto Rico, unequal representation of socioeconomic background on juries
translates into unequal representation of racial and color backgrounds.  Peo-
ple of higher socioeconomic status and educational background tend to be
predominately of European (Spanish) descent and lighter skinned.  Puerto
Ricans of mixed race and, even more pronouncedly, Puerto Ricans of pre-
dominately African heritage are statistically poorer and less educated.97
Thus, not only are potential federal jurors in Puerto Rico wealthier and more
educated, they are also disproportionately white when compared to the gen-
eral public.
II. A CENTURY OF DENIAL OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
For over a century, the people of Puerto Rico have been denied the
constitutional right to a jury pool selected from a fair cross section of the
community.  However, Congress has not intervened.  This is not due to any
lack of power on behalf of Congress to remedy the injustice, but rather due
to the lack of political power held by the residents of Puerto Rico.  History
and commonsense tell us that the likelihood of federal legislative action is
highly correlated with the political power of the populations who stand to
benefit from the potential legislation.  Although Puerto Rico is subject to
federal laws and control, Puerto Ricans’ participation in the federal political
95 Pousada, supra note 32, at 138 (“The highest concentration of English speakers in Pu- R
erto Rico is found in Guaynabo which is also the most affluent municipality, while the least
English fluency is found in Las Marias, one of the very poorest towns on the island . . . .”)
(citing Barreto, supra note 59, at 8–9 (finding “a connection between affluence and R
bilingualism”)).
96 It should be noted that there is a small population of Anglophone expatriates from the
U.S. mainland residing in Puerto Rico who are not of Puerto Rican or Latino background.
These individuals are rarely summoned for jury service.  It appears that no research has been
conducted on why these individuals are not summoned.  A likely explanation is that most
expatriates probably retain their stateside voter registration in order to continue to be able to
participate in federal elections.  Since jury lists come from the Commonwealth roster of regis-
ter voters, individuals who are not registered to vote in Puerto Rico will not be called to jury
service.
97 See Liza Mónica Ayuso Quiñones, La Guerra Contra las Drogas, Guerra Contra el
Pobre: Aspectos Socioeconómicos de la Polı́tica Pública, 75 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1411, 1441 &
n.128 (2006) (stating there is a prevalent belief that in Puerto Rico the poorer classes consist
mostly of Afro-Puerto Ricans and persons of mixed race); see also Jorge Duany, Neither White
nor Black: The Representation of Racial Identity Among Puerto Ricans on the Island and in
the U.S. Mainland, in NEITHER ENEMIES NOR FRIENDS: LATINOS, BLACKS, AFRO-LATINOS 177
(Anani Dzidzienyo & Suzanne Oboler eds., 2005) (discussing race in Puerto Rico and how
racial classifications are focused on skin color over familial heritage and how “many people
prefer to identify as white to avoid racial stigmatization”); Maxine W. Gordon, Race Patterns
and Prejudice in Puerto Rico, 14 AM. SOC. REV. 294, 298, 300 (1949).
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system is severely limited.  Puerto Rico’s only elected federal representative
is a single Resident Commissioner, who is a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives but cannot vote on legislation.98  While Puerto Rico is sub-
ject to all executive powers, Puerto Ricans are not allowed to vote in U.S.
presidential elections.99  Native-born Puerto Ricans’ U.S. citizenship is statu-
torily, rather than constitutionally, conferred as a birthright and thus poten-
tially revocable.100  Residents of Puerto Rico are also afforded limited
protection under the Constitution.101  And, of course, the majority of Puerto
Ricans cannot participate in the federal judicial system as jurors.
This second-class status and political powerlessness at the federal level
have their origins in the United States Supreme Court’s Insular Cases.102  The
Insular Cases sanctioned colonialism and incomplete application of constitu-
tional rights in Puerto Rico.  Colonialism and deficient constitutional protec-
98 See 48 U.S.C. § 891 (2006); Lawson & Sloane, supra note 17, at 1164. R
99 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legisla-
ture thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . . ”) (emphasis added);
see also Lani E. Medina, An Unsatisfactory Case of Self-Determination: Resolving Puerto
Rico’s Political Status, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1048, 1050 (2010) (citing Igartúa-De La Rosa
v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding residents of Puerto Rico do not have a
right to vote in presidential elections)).
100 Organic Act of 1917 (Jones Act), ch. 145, § 44, 39 Stat. 966 (1917) (repealed 1968)
(making persons born in Puerto Rico on or after January 13, 1941 citizens of the United
States); Eduardo Guzmán, Comment, Igartúa De La Rosa v. United States: The Right of the
United States Citizens of Puerto Rico to Vote for the President and the Need to Re-evaluate
America’s Territorial Policy, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 163–64 (2001); see Adriel I. Cepeda
Derieux, Note, A Most Insular Minority: Reconsidering Judicial Deference to Unequal Treat-
ment in Light of Puerto Rico’s Political Process Failure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 797, 797–98
(2010) (“‘[T]he statutory citizenship status of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico . . . is not equal,
full, permanent, irrevocable citizenship protected by the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution . . . . ’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-131, pt. 1, at 19 (1997)); see also Christina Duffy
Burnett, “They Say I Am not an American . . .”: The Noncitizen National and the Law of
American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 659, 662 (2008).
101 Initially Puerto Rico was subject to incomplete constitutional protection pursuant to the
“Insular Cases,” and currently the rights to equal protection and due process are applied dif-
ferently to Puerto Rico than the rest of the nation. See Cepeda Derieux, supra note 99, at R
797–98.
102 JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEP-
ARATE AND UNEQUAL 4 (1985); Malavet, supra note 59, at 29, 39.  The “Insular Cases” in- R
clude the original cases of 1901 considering the political status of Puerto Rico: De Lima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901) (holding that through ratification of the Treaty of Paris, Puerto Rico
became a territory of the United States and thus not a foreign country for purpose of tariff
laws); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901) (holding application of tariff law to prod-
ucts exported from the United States to Puerto Rico is permissible); Armstrong v. United
States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901) (holding war powers allow the federal government to receive
duties on Puerto Rico importations from the United States); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901) (holding Puerto Rico is domestic in the sense that it belongs to the United States but is
foreign in that it is not part of the United States for the purposes of the revenue clauses of the
Constitution).  A broader usage of the term “Insular Cases” also includes Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922) (holding although Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, they have no Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury), Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914), Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905), Dorr v.
United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), and Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
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tions meant not only limited political sovereignty, but also limited
opportunities for citizens to participate in the two primary opportunities for
self-governance in our democratic system:  electoral voting and jury service.
Further, the decision to colonize Puerto Rico and the Insular Cases’ sanction
of this colonization were greatly influenced by xenophobia and racism.  At
the time, many politicians felt that Puerto Rico was not suitable for incorpo-
ration into the union or capable of self-government due to the population’s
African and mixed-race heritage and the fact that the population spoke Span-
ish.  A century later, the Insular Cases remain “good” law103 and (along with
their political and legal progeny) continue to limit Puerto Ricans’ political
influence and ability to participate in self-governance at the federal level.  In
the jury context, this exclusion from democratic participation falls particu-
larly hard on the same groups of Puerto Ricans whose race, color, and lan-
guage motivated the Insular Cases:  black Puerto Ricans, persons of mixed
race, and monolingual Spanish speakers.
A. The Insular Cases
The Treaty of Paris provided that “[t]he civil rights and political status
of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States
shall be determined by the Congress.”104  Thus, the sovereignty, citizenship,
and application of the protections of the Constitution to Puerto Ricans re-
mained open and subject to the whim of the U.S. legislature.105  These issues
were addressed by the Supreme Court in a line of cases collectively termed
the “Insular Cases.”106  The Insular Cases dealt with two highly interrelated
questions:  (1) whether colonialism was constitutionally permissible and (2)
whether the rights guaranteed under the Constitution applied in the newly
acquired territories.  Jurists and scholars often conflate these issues and fo-
cus only on the Supreme Court’s extraterritorial application of the Constitu-
tion.107  However, the possibly more significant consequence of the Insular
Cases was that their reasoning sanctioned colonialism, and by extension se-
103 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008) (stating that the Insular Cases
informed the Court’s analysis of whether habeas corpus was available to aliens detained at
Guantanamo Bay).
104 Treaty of Paris, supra note 13, at 1759. R
105 These issues were hotly debated in legal academia before being addressed by the Su-
preme Court.  The so-called “Harvard Debate” produced a succession of articles that in many
ways framed the Insular Cases. See, e.g., Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions
Incident to the Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV.
L. REV. 393 (1899); C. C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365
(1899); Abbot L. Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions—A Third View, 13 HARV. L.
REV. 155 (1899); Carman F. Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 291 (1898); Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1899).
106 For list of Insular Cases, see supra note 102. R
107 See Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Domes-
tic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A DO-
MESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1, 10–11
(Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
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verely limited Puerto Ricans’ ability to participate in federal self-governance
activities of electoral voting and jury service.
1. Judicial Authorization of Colonialism
The United States opted for a colonial system of government over Pu-
erto Rico because it wanted to possess the island for economic and military
purposes, but did not want to slate Puerto Rico for eventual statehood.108
However, since a colonial form of government was to be used by Ameri-
cans, to whom “colonialism” was not a popular political theory, a constitu-
tional analysis was necessary to justify imperialism.109  The Insular Cases
provided an opportunity for the Court to provide such a justification.  These
decisions confirmed Congress’s discretion not to incorporate a territory into
the United States, making it clear that acquisition of a territory does not have
to lead to either future statehood or independence.110  In other words, a colo-
nial government need not be temporary or a step towards statehood; it can be
an end in itself.  By virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the Foraker Act, Puerto
Rico was no longer a foreign country,111 but would not be considered part of
the United States either.112  As such, in the words of Justice Edward
Douglass White, Puerto Rico is “foreign . . . in a domestic sense.”113  This
distinction of foreignness, in terms of geographic location as well as race
and culture, provided a justification to deny Puerto Rican residents the con-
stitutional and political protections afforded to mainland U.S. citizens.
2. The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution
After determining that the United States did indeed have the constitu-
tional authorization to take possession of the islands without any promise of
incorporation into the union, the Court turned to the issue of whether the
Constitution applied ex propio vigore (“by its own force”) to the territo-
ries.114  In making this assessment, the Court distinguished between territo-
ries that were deemed “incorporated” and those that were designated
“unincorporated.”  Unlike incorporated territories, unincorporated territo-
ries, including Puerto Rico, were determined not to have the full protection
108 Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases:  The Establishment of a Regime of Political
Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 283, 289–90 (2007).
109 Id. at 290.
110 See Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA:  The Strik-
ing Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications
Clause and Why We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 93 (2005); Krishanti Vignarajah, The
Political Roots of Judicial Legitimacy: Explaining the Enduring Validity of the Insular Cases,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 790 n.82 (2010).
111 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 196–97 (1901).
112 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901); see also id. at 341–42 (White, J.,
concurring).
113 Id. at 341 (White, J., concurring).
114 See Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 530 (1905) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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of the Constitution.115  In other words, while all of the constitutional provi-
sions applied to incorporated territories, not all of them applied to unincor-
porated territories.
In determining which rights apply to unincorporated territories, the
Court made a distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental consti-
tutional rights.116  The Court determined that only certain rights were “fun-
damental” and that only these fundamental rights applied to Puerto Rico.117
Initially, fundamental rights included due process and the provision against
ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.118  Non-fundamental rights included
Sixth Amendment rights to a grand jury, trial by jury, and to confront wit-
nesses.119  Later, Sixth Amendment rights were deemed fundamental,120 and
thus are currently applicable in Puerto Rico.  However, the vestiges of sec-
ond-class citizenship, racism, and xenophobia that motivated the Insular
Cases continue to perpetuate limited Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section
protections for the bulk of Puerto Rico’s residents.
3. The Racial Implications of the Insular Cases: Setting the Stage
for Juror Exclusion
The decisions to colonize Puerto Rico, as well as the other Treaty of
Paris territories, and to limit constitutional protections of their inhabitants
were greatly motivated by concerns about the race, color, and language of
the islands’ inhabitants.  The United States had possessed several territories
before acquiring Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines, and Guam.  However,
these preceding territories were treated differently:  from the outset they had
been slated for statehood and promised political rights and citizenship.121
Puerto Rico and the other Treaty of Paris acquisitions were not.  Stateside
there were concerns about the prospect of joining these islands into the
union from the beginning.  Not only were the islands non-contiguous and
geographically distant, they were composed of persons with different racial
and language backgrounds than that of the Anglo-Protestant majority in
115 Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 215–18 (1903).
116 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922).
117 Id.
118 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277, 282 (1901); see also Robert A. Katz, The
Jurisprudence of Legitimacy:  Applying the Constitution to U.S. Territories, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
779, 783 (1992).
119 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 313–14; see generally Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the
Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1198, 1227 n.214 (1991) (“Fundamental rights are those which are ‘basic to a
free society,’ that are ‘implied in the concept of ordered liberty,’ and the denial of which would
‘shock the conscience.’” (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
269, 501 n.75 (1st ed. 1972))).
120 For discussion of the Supreme Court’s evolving understanding of whether Sixth
Amendment rights are fundamental rights, see supra note 7. R
121 Juan F. Perea, Fulfilling Manifest Destiny:  Conquest, Race, and the Insular Cases, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 107, at 140, 156; cf. O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 537 (1933). R
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power in the United States.122  The population of Puerto Rico was primarily
mixed race (of Spanish, African, and indigenous ancestry), which accord-
ingly “rendered the island incapable of independent self-government in the
eyes of Americans.”123
This belief that the territories’ inhabitants’ racial, color, and language
backgrounds made them unsuitable for self-governance also influenced the
Insular Cases.  The Insular Cases should not be viewed in isolation.  The
original Insular Cases,124 which affirmed colonization and disparate treat-
ment of a discrete racial group (Puerto Ricans), were rendered only five
years after the Supreme Court’s decision in the infamous case of Plessy v.
Ferguson.125 Plessy approved so-called “separate but equal” treatment of
African Americans, but was eventually overruled by Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation in 1954.126  The Insular Cases, however, remain forceful law that con-
tinues to authorize disparate treatment of an entire class of citizens.127  As
First Circuit Judge Juan Torruella has suggested, the Insular Cases have cre-
ated a perpetual “doctrine of separate and unequal.”128
As Juan Perea has elucidated, the decision to colonize Puerto Rico and
the judicial reasoning sanctioning this status in the Insular Cases were heav-
ily motivated by concerns about the racial make-up of Puerto Ricans and
their supposed unfitness for statehood or self-rule.129  This sentiment is re-
vealed in the seminal Insular Case of Downes v. Bidwell,130 where “[t]he
Court viewed citizenship as reserved for ‘civilized’ people like Anglo Amer-
icans, and not for others . . . fear[ing] ‘extremely serious’ consequences if
citizenship were conferred upon ‘savages.’” 131  The Downes Court further
122 Perea, supra note 121, at 156–57; Torruella, supra note 108, at 288–89. R
123 Perea, supra note 121, at 156 (internal quotations omitted); see generally RUBIN FRAN- R
CIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1893–1946, at 15 (1972).
124 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243
(1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co.,
182 U.S. 392 (1901).
125 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
126 Id. at 552; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy sub silento);
see Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (desegregating public buses by refer-
ring to Brown).
127 Torruella, supra note 108, at 286 (“As in the instance of the legal framework estab- R
lished by Plessy, the Insular Cases have had lasting and deleterious effects on a substantial
minority of citizens.  The ‘redeeming’ difference is that Plessy is no longer the law of the land,
while the [Insular Cases] . . . are responsible for the establishment of a regime of de facto
political apartheid, which continues in full vigor.”).
128 Id. at 291; see TORRUELLA, supra note 102, at 117, 265. R
129 See Perea, supra note 121, at 157. R
130 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). For a detailed study of the case see Pedro A.
Malavet,“The Constitution Follows the Flag . . . But Doesn’t Quite Catch Up With It”:  The
Story of Downes v. Bidwell, in RACE LAW STORIES 111, 111–46 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon
W. Carbado eds., 2008).
131 Perea, supra note 121, at 157. R
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expressed that different treatment of governance was warranted due to the
island’s racial composition:
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant posses-
sions grave questions will arise from differences of race, habits,
laws, and customs of the people, and from differences of soil, cli-
mate, and production, which may require action on the part of
Congress that would be quite unnecessary in the annexation of
contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same race, or
by scattered bodies of native Indians.132
In Downes, the Court found the fact that Puerto Rico and other Treaty
of Paris possessions were comprised of “alien races” justified denial of self-
government and the indefinite extension of colonial power over Puerto Rico.
If those possessions are inhabited by alien races, differing from us
in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of
thought, the administration of government and justice, according
to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be impossible; and the
question at once arises whether large concessions ought not to be
made for a time, that ultimately our own theories may be carried
out, and the blessings of a free government under the Constitution
extended to them. We decline to hold that there is anything in the
Constitution to forbid such action.133
The congressional debates concerning the Jones Act and its provision
statutorily granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans were preoccupied with the
perceived inferiority of the races of Puerto Rico.  Of particular concern was
the prevalence of African heritage, the perceived incapability of the islands’
inhabitants to comprehend Anglo-Saxon government or to self-govern, and
the alleged potential dangers posed by incorporation of these groups into the
United States.134  The Jones Act eventually gave Puerto Ricans U.S. citizen-
ship, but this was, and continues to be, an inferior citizenship statutorily
conferred and not constitutionally acquired.  As Senator Joseph B. Foraker
summarized, the legislature was not comfortable with the terms “aliens” or
“subjects,” so they adopted the term “citizens.”135  But in so doing they did
not intend to give Puerto Ricans “any rights that the American people do not
want them to have.”136  Even after the Jones Act granted Puerto Ricans citi-
zenship, the Insular Cases’ extraterritorial application of limited constitu-
tional rights was still applicable because “[i]t is locality that is
132 Downes, 182 U.S. at 282.
133 Id. at 287.
134 Perea, supra note 121, at 161. R
135 José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative His-
tory of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 428 (1978)
(quoting 33 CONG. REC. 2473–74 (1900) (statement of Sen. Foraker)).
136 Id.
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determinative of the application of the Constitution . . . and not the [citizen-
ship] status of the people who live in it.”137
Lawmakers’ beliefs that Puerto Ricans were racially inferior and unfit
for self-governance not only determined colonial rule, but also determined
the specific attributes of that government.  This included the unilateral impo-
sition of English as the language of the federal court.  The English-only
mandates in the federal courts simultaneously ensured Anglo- and An-
glophone-American rule in the court and the exclusion of Puerto Rican par-
ticipation in (although not subjugation to) the federal court.  At the time of
its implementation, Congress could have chosen to conduct court in Spanish
or interpret the English proceedings into Spanish.  If the United States had
wanted Puerto Rican participation, it undoubtedly would have pursued one
of these options.  It did not.  Thus, one of the original purposes of the En-
glish language requirement was to subordinate Puerto Ricans and wholly
exclude the populations which the government deemed as most undesirable:
those of African and mixed race heritage.
It comes as no surprise then that a government which believed Puerto
Ricans incapable of self-governing or understanding Anglo-American politi-
cal systems would essentially shut out that group from decisionmaking as
jurors in the national court.  Not only were the judges and officers of the
court white Americans, early juries were also composed substantially of
mainland Americans.138  As few native inhabitants of Puerto Rico spoke En-
glish, it was challenging for the court to find enough jurors qualified to
serve.139  Thus, federal jury service was reserved for only a privileged minor-
ity.  Sadly, over a century later, little has changed.  Although mainlanders do
not usually sit on federal juries, the bulk of Puerto Rico’s inhabitants are
excluded from service and juries are selected from a relatively elite socio-
economic, racial, and color group.
In no other court in our federal system would the exclusion of all but
10% of the adult population from jury service be allowed.  The near total
exclusion of persons of color from the jury box would not be tolerated.
However, in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico,
these injustices have existed for over a century.  A critical examination of
the constitutionality and local applicability of the federal English language
juror requirement in Puerto Rico is long overdue.
137 Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922).
138 Cabranes, supra note 22, at 43. R
139 See Baralt, supra note 18, at 121–23 & n.35. R
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III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
JUROR REQUIREMENT
A. The Sixth Amendment Fair-Cross-Section Requirement
The notion of a “jury of one’s peers” dates back at least eight centuries
to the Magna Carta.140  In American criminal141 jurisprudence, this concept is
advanced not by a guarantee that an individual petit jury will represent the
defendant’s personal background or even that of the community, but rather
that the jury pool will be selected from a “fair cross section” of the commu-
nity.142  This fundamental imperative has developed through interpretation of
the Sixth Amendment’s Impartiality Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause, and was later statutorily codified in the JSSA.143
1. Development of the Requirement
The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . . . .”144  At the time of its adoption, in 1791, juries were not
particularly representative of the communities from which they were drawn,
since the privilege of serving as jurors was limited to white male property
owners.145  It would be another almost ninety years before the United States
140 MAGNA CARTA § 39 (1215) (“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped
of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other
way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful
judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.” (translation)); see Ellen E. Sward, Justifica-
tion and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 458 (2004).
141 This Article focuses on the criminal aspects of juror exclusion in Puerto Rico because
of the unique constitutional protections and punitive consequences associated with criminal
proceedings.  The lack of representative juries in civil trials in the District Court for Puerto
Rico also warrants study, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
142 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (“Defendants are not entitled to a jury
of any particular composition; but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels or venires from
which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community
and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.”) (internal citations omitted); JEFFREY
ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 99 (2000)
(“[T]he particular jury a person gets may not itself form a cross section of the community.
But so long as jurors are summoned randomly from an initially representative list, the demo-
cratic nature of jury membership is said to be preserved.”); RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE
AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 119 (2003).
143 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006) (“It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at
random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes.”).
144 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
145 JONAKAIT, supra note 142, at 114; Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethinking the Fair R
Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CAL. L. REV. 101, 107 (1996) (citing JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY
SELECTION PROCEDURES:  OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 13–14
(1977)).
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Supreme Court recognized the right of African American males to partici-
pate in juries, finding that the exclusion of this population on the basis of
race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.146
The subsequent jurisprudence addressing juror exclusion similarly fo-
cused on the Fourteenth Amendment.147  Unlike other Equal Protection cases
of the time, which may have concentrated primarily on the intent of the state
to discriminate on the basis of a protected characteristic, the juror-exclusion
cases included facially neutral statutes that resulted in a statistical under-
representation of certain groups in the community.  For instance, in Norris v.
Alabama, the defendants successfully established an Equal Protection viola-
tion by demonstrating that, despite the existence of qualified blacks in the
community, in at least twenty-four years no black individual had ever served
on a jury.148  Proof that qualified blacks “constituted a substantial segment of
the population of the jurisdiction” and that “some” were qualified to serve
as jurors but had never been summoned over an extended period of time was
later termed the “rule of exclusion” and was found sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of an Equal Protection violation.149
In the 1940 case of Smith v. Texas, a unanimous Supreme Court ex-
panded upon the rule of exclusion and first articulated the importance of
juries “truly representative” of the community, the concept preceding the
modern fair-cross-section requirement.150  In Harris County, Texas, African
Americans constituted 20% of the population, and it was estimated that a
minimum of three to six thousand such individuals were qualified for jury
service.151  However, for the period of 1931–1938, only 3.5% of individuals
summoned for grand jury service and only 1.3% of grand jurors who served
during that period were African American.152  Upon review of this statistical
evidence, the Court reversed an African American defendant’s conviction,
having found that blacks had been unconstitutionally excluded from the
county’s jury system.153  Justice Black, on behalf of the Court, stated:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instru-
ments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative
of the community.  For racial discrimination to result in the exclu-
sion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only vio-
lates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war
146 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
147 See, e.g., Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 357 (1939); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316,
319 (1906); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900).
148 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935).
149 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954).
150 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (holding that “juries as instruments of public
justice . . . [should] be a body truly representative of the community”).
151 Id. at 128–29.
152 Id. at 129.
153 Id. at 131–32.
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with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representa-
tive government.154
Two years later in Glasser v. United States, the Supreme Court applied
this community representation concept within the parameters of the Sixth
Amendment’s Impartiality Clause to the systematic exclusion of women
from juries in the federal courts.155  Expounding upon its decision in Smith v.
Texas, the Court explained that “the proper functioning of the jury system,
and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a [sic] truly
representative of the community . . . .”156  Even more importantly, the Court,
for the first time, introduced the theory of the fair cross section as intrinsi-
cally linked with impartiality and true representativeness.  The Court found
“officials charged with choosing federal jurors” must not make “selections
which do not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the
community.” 157
The first century and a half of juror-exclusion cases focused predomi-
nately on African Americans,158 and to a lesser degree, women.159  However,
it had long been recognized, at least in theory, that exclusion of other classes
of persons from jury service could also be unconstitutional.160  The question
then remained: which groups are protected?  The Supreme Court began to
explore this query in Hernandez v. Texas, a 1954 case challenging the exclu-
sion of Mexican Americans from grand jury service in Jackson County,
Texas.161  The initial inquiry was whether Mexican Americans constituted a
distinctive group or class in the community, which could be demonstrated by
the community attitude toward and treatment of that group.162   The Court
held that Mexican Americans were a distinctive class and that exclusion
solely on the basis of ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited
under the Fourteenth Amendment.163
In 1968, Congress codified the fair-cross-section requirement in the
JSSA as a means to facilitate compliance with the Sixth Amendment’s Im-
partiality Clause.164  The JSSA provides that “all litigants in Federal courts
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community . . . .”165  The Act
154 Id. at 130 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
155 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942).
156 Id. at 86.
157 Id. (emphasis added).
158 See, e.g., Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 357 (1939); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316,
319 (1906); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900).
159 See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Glasser, 315 U.S. at 84.
160 See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1954) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 479.
163 Id. at 482.
164 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006).
165 Id.
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further delineates that “[n]o citizen shall be excluded from service as a
grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States . . . on account
of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.”166  The Act
is consistent with the preceding jurisprudence on juror exclusion, in that it
ensures the right to cross-sectional jury selection, rather than merely provid-
ing a remedy for intentional discrimination.
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court continued to distance itself from an
intentional discrimination standard, recognizing violations of the constitu-
tional right to an impartial jury where the exclusion of a group from the jury
pool was statistically significant, but not absolute, and the governing juror
statute or policies were facially neutral but had a disproportionate systematic
impact.167  The Court further recognized that a criminal defendant has stand-
ing to object to the systematic exclusion of a group even where the defen-
dant is not a member of that group.168
Most notably, the Court in Taylor v. Louisiana declared unequivocally
that the fair-cross-section requirement is fundamental to the Sixth Amend-
ment right to trial by jury.169  The Court found the fundamental Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury selected from a fair cross section had been
denied to a male defendant when, as a result of an opt-in procedure requiring
women to declare in writing their desire to be subject to jury service before
being placed on the jury wheel, only 10% of the jury wheel was comprised
of women, even though women represented 53% of the jurisdiction’s popula-
tion.170  In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that women were “suf-
ficiently numerous and distinct from men and that if they are systematically
eliminated from jury panels, the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section re-
quirement cannot be satisfied.”171  The Court also noted that “the two sexes
are not fungible . . . . [A] flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is
excluded.”172
Later, in Duren v. Missouri, the Supreme Court explicitly delineated the
contemporary requirements of a fair-cross-section challenge and found that
an exemption from jury duty for members of an entire sex violated the Sixth
Amendment.173  The defendant, convicted of first-degree murder and first-
degree robbery, argued that his constitutional rights had been violated due to
166 Id. § 1862.
167 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975).
168 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (finding that a white defendant had standing to
challenge the systematic exclusion of blacks from jury service since “the exclusion of a dis-
cernible class from jury service injures not only those defendants who belong to the excluded
class, but other defendants as well, in that it destroys the possibility that the jury will reflect a
representative cross section of the community”); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526 (finding that a male
defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of women from the jury pool).
169 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (“We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental
to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment . . . .”).
170 Id. at 524, 537.
171 Id. at 531.
172 Id. at 531–32.
173 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
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a state statute that granted broad exemptions to any woman who requested to
be excluded from jury duty, which led to an unrepresentative, gendered jury
venire.174  The Court set forth a three-part test that defendants needed to
prove in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in
the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation
to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in
the jury-selection process.175
However, the Court said that the government could overcome a demonstra-
tion of a fair-cross-section violation if “those aspects of the jury-selection
process,” which result “in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive
group,” advanced a significant state interest.176
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Taylor’s finding that women constituted
a “distinctive” group in the community.177  They relied on the statistical cen-
sus data in Duren, indicating that women made up 54% of citizens eligible
for jury service in the community, in order to establish the second prong.178
Then, the Court found that women were grossly underrepresented at certain
stages in the jury-selection process, which established systematic exclu-
sion.179  Finally, the Court found that Missouri’s exemption of “all women
because of the preclusive domestic responsibilities of some” was insufficient
to meet the significant state interest requirement to justify the under-
representation.180  Ultimately, the Court held that the broad exemptions were
unreasonable and operated to violate the right to an impartial jury recognized
in Duren.181
2. Fair-Cross-Section Challenges to the Language Requirement in
Puerto Rico
Defendants appearing in criminal proceedings in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Puerto Rico have unsuccessfully challenged the
constitutionality of the English proficiency juror requirement as violating
their Sixth Amendment rights on the ground that the requirement impermis-
174 Id. at 360 (The Missouri statute provided that “[n]o citizen shall be disqualified from
jury service because of sex, but the court shall excuse any woman who requests exemption
there from before being sworn as a juror”).
175 Id. at 364.
176 Id. at 367–68.
177 Id. at 364.
178 Id. at 365.
179 Id. at 365–67.
180 Id. at 369.
181 Id. at 370.
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sibly excludes non-English speakers.  This issue has received only cursory
treatment by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and has
never been addressed by the United States Supreme Court.
In the ostensibly decisive case of United States v. Benmuhar, the defen-
dant argued that his Sixth Amendment right to a representative jury from a
fair cross section of the community had been violated because the English
language requirement systematically excluded persons who did not speak,
“ ‘read, write, or understand the English language with a degree of profi-
ciency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form
. . . .’” 182  The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit assumed
arguendo that non-English speakers were a distinctive group.183  The court
further found that Benmuhar had sufficiently demonstrated that the English
requirement operates systematically to exclude this group.184
However, the court also found that the government had a significant
interest in having national courts all operate in the national language of En-
glish and that this interest was “primarily advanced by the [English] re-
quirement.”185  The court then noted several factors that supported the
“significant” interest:  providing venue alternatives; providing uniformity
expected in national courts, which are different from local courts; providing
nonresident non-Spanish-speaking citizens use of the district court; provid-
ing easy access for members of the Attorney General’s staff; allowing easy
transfer of judges; and avoiding “translation distortions.”186  Ultimately, the
court held that Benmuhar’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by the
English language requirement’s exclusionary effect on the jury selection
process.187
Nearly ten years after Benmuhar, the First Circuit cursorily reaffirmed
its decision in United States v. Aponte-Suarez188 by upholding the English
language requirement.  Defendant Aponte-Suarez, along with others, ap-
pealed his conviction on multiple conspiracy and drug charges.189  He argued
that the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that tried him both
lacked the proficiency in English required of federal jurors; that Puerto Ri-
cans were less proficient in English as a population; and that the language
182 United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1865(b)(2) (2006)).  The defendant also alleged that other distinctive groups were over-
represented or underrepresented in juries including, inter alia, rural residents, women, persons
with less than an eighth grade education, certain persons of lower socio-economic back-
grounds or occupations, and blacks. Id. at 19 n.2.  However, the court limited their inquiry to
persons without English language proficiency, “since appellant [did] not suggest that other




185 Id. at 19 (internal quotations omitted).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1990).
189 Id. at 486.
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requirement systematically excluded residents, resulting in a fair-cross-sec-
tion violation.190  The court found that there was no evidence of a lack of
proficiency among the jurors who indicted or tried the defendant.191  Then,
without any further analysis, the court summarily affirmed the holding in
Benmuhar.  The court held that “the overwhelming national interest served
by the use of English in a United States court justifies proceedings in the
District Court of Puerto Rico in English and requiring jurors to be proficient
in that language.”192
Five years later, a defendant yet again raised a Sixth Amendment fair-
cross-section argument on language grounds.  In United States v. Flores-
Rivera,193 the First Circuit once more upheld the English language require-
ment.  Defendant Flores-Rivera argued that the language requirement vio-
lated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by excluding two-thirds of the
Puerto Rican population.194  Unsurprisingly, the court disregarded Flores-Ri-
vera’s argument in passing, simply stating that the issue had already been
decided in Benmuhar and affirmed in Aponte-Suarez.195  In the 2002 case of
United States v. Dubón-Otero, defendants sought to distinguish these prior
cases as “having been decided in part upon the absence of any viable alter-
native” and suggested that simultaneous translation be employed to allow
non-English speakers to serve on juries.196  Without commenting on the pros-
pect of translation, the court rejected defendants’ contentions and simply re-
iterated that the national interest in use of English in a U.S. court justifies
requiring jurors be proficient in English and that “[t]his justification is inde-
pendent of the presence or lack of any viable alternatives.”197
Thus, in the First Circuit the current law provides that the JSSA English
language prerequisite systematically excludes non-English speakers, but that
this procedure is constitutional because it advances the federal government’s
interest in conducting proceedings in English.  This case law is flawed be-
cause it ignores the fact that the government’s interest in maintaining English
language proceedings and the rights of non-English speakers are not at odds
with each other.  Monolingual Spanish speakers in Puerto Rico could easily
and effectively serve as jurors in the English language federal court through
the use of interpreters.
190 Id. at 491–92.
191 Id. at 492.
192 Id. (citing United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1981)).
193 United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319 (1st Cir. 1995).
194 Id. at 326.
195 Id.
196 United States v. Dubón-Otero, 292 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2002).
197 Id.
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3. Making a Fair-Cross-Section Case for Monolingual Spanish
Speakers
There are five primary groups who are systematically excluded under
the JSSA language requirement in Puerto Rico:  black Latinos, Puerto Ri-
cans of color, the poor, persons with less than a high school education, and
non-English (or more narrowly, monolingual Spanish) speakers.  From a
pragmatic view, a fair-cross-section challenge focusing on the exclusion of
black Latinos and mixed race Puerto Ricans under the JSSA requirement
would be the most prudent.  It is well settled that the exclusion of racial or
color groups can violate the fair-cross-section requirement, and thus the dis-
tinctiveness prong of a Duren analysis could easily be satisfied.198  However,
for the purposes of this Article, the focus will be on the larger issue of
whether the exclusion of monolingual Spanish speakers199 (a group which
includes most black Latinos, Puerto Ricans of color, the poor, and persons
with less than a high school education) can amount to a fair-cross-section
violation in Puerto Rico.
The initial obstacle in asserting that the exclusion of monolingual Span-
ish speakers from federal juries in Puerto Rico constitutes a fair-cross-sec-
tion violation under the Sixth Amendment is the fact that the JSSA expressly
disqualifies non-English proficient persons from federal jury service.  Some
courts have held that non-English speakers cannot be considered a cogniza-
ble group entitled to representation in the jury pool for Sixth Amendment
purposes because such individuals are not eligible for jury service under the
JSSA.200  This reasoning risks being circular:  the exclusion of non-English
speakers does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section require-
ment because non-English speakers are statutorily prohibited from jury ser-
vice.  In other words, they can be constitutionally excluded simply because
they are statutorily excluded.
Such a circulus in probando is akin to the flawed reasoning that a stat-
ute specifically prohibiting a racial or gender group from jury service could
be the basis to foreclose fair-cross-section challenges for these populations.
The anticipated response to this analogy is likely that racial and gender clas-
sifications are subjected to heightened constitutional scrutiny, and thus ex-
clusion of these populations would be found facially unconstitutional as
violative of the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments.  Under equal protection analysis, non-English speakers and
198 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
199 For the purposes of this Article, the term monolingual Spanish speaker includes func-
tionally monolingual Spanish speakers who may speak some English but not enough to qualify
for jury service in Puerto Rico under the JSSA and the United States District Court for Puerto
Rico’s Jury Plan.
200 See, e.g., United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 595 (10th Cir. 1976).  However, the First
Circuit, which includes Puerto Rico, has assumed that non-English speakers constitute a cogni-
zable group. See United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1981).
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language classifications are not afforded heightened constitutional scrutiny
unless there is a sufficient nexus between the language discrimination and
race, ethnicity, or national origin.201  However, the Sixth Amendment analy-
sis here focuses on a potential fair-cross-section claim, not an equal protec-
tion claim.  A fair-cross-section claim must only result from a “systematic”
exclusion, does not require any demonstration of intent to discriminate
against or exclude a group, and does not implicate different levels of judicial
scrutiny for different classifications of groups.202  Fair-cross-section and
equal protection juror-exclusion claims “protect[ ] different values.
Whereas the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination, the fair-cross-
section requirement of the Sixth Amendment defines the type of jury to
which criminal defendants are entitled:  a jury drawn from a representative
pool.”203
We turn now to whether the exclusion of monolingual Spanish speakers
in Puerto Rico amounts to a fair-cross-section violation under the Sixth
Amendment.  As discussed above, the Court in Duren v. Missouri set forth a
three-part test to determine a fair-cross-section violation:
201 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371–72 (1991) (plurality opinion) (con-
cluding that peremptory challenges to prospective jurors on the basis of bilingual language
ability was subject to only minimal scrutiny when a prosecutor presents a sufficient race-
neutral reason for asserting the challenge); John Hill et al., Watch Your Language! The Kansas
Law Review Survey of Official-English and English-only Laws and Policies, 57 U. KAN. L.
REV. 669, 709 (2009) (“‘Most courts have concluded that language classifications do not
require heightened scrutiny.’”) (quoting Colin A. Kisor, Using Interpreters to Assist Jurors:  A
Plea for Consistency, 22 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 37, 46 (2001)); Andrew P. Averbach, Note,
Language Classifications and the Equal Protection Clause:  When Is Language a Pretext for
Race or Ethnicity, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 488 (1994); Donna F. Coltharp, Comment, Speaking
the Language of Exclusion: How Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights Analyses Permit
Language Discrimination, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 149, 168, 172–73 (1996) (“[L]anguage dis-
crimination nearly always receives minimal scrutiny. . . . No lower court has found language,
by itself, to be a suspect classification.  However, a few courts have found a sufficient connec-
tion between language and national origin to trigger strict scrutiny.”).  There are persuasive
arguments that language discrimination should be subject to heightened scrutiny under the
equal protection law. See Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference:  To-
ward a Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.–C.L.
L. REV. 133, 171 (2001).
202 JONAKAIT, supra note 142, at 120; Robin E. Schulberg, Katrina Juries, Fair Cross- R
Section Claims, and the Legacy of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 53 LOY. L. REV. 1 (2007).
Another concern about recognizing monolingual Spanish speakers as a cognizable group for
Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section purposes is the mutability of language ability.  However,
unlike anti-discrimination law, mutability of the group’s central shared characteristic is not
fatal.  A cognizable group can be any “recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different
treatment under the laws, as written or applied.”  Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494
(1977); ABRAMSON, supra note 142, at 117.  Recognized groups for fair-cross-section purposes R
have included groups based on potentially mutable characteristics such as religion and eco-
nomic status. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223–24 (1946) (holding a federal court’s
exclusion of daily-wage workers from the jury list on financial hardship grounds violated the
fair-cross-section requirement and would result in discrimination “against persons of low eco-
nomic and social status”). See generally Rodrı́guez, supra note 201, at 142 (considering lan- R
guage as mutable and presenting language rights in terms of a mutability continuum).
203 Schulberg, supra note 202, at 3, 24 (emphasis added). R
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(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in
the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation
to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in
the jury selection process.204
The first factor, and indeed “[t]he essence of a fair-cross-section claim[,] is
the systematic exclusion of a distinctive group in the community.”205  “In
assessing a group’s distinctiveness . . .  [c]ourts generally consider whether
members of the group share: (1) an attribute that defines and limits the
group; (2) a common attitude, idea, or experience that distinguishes the
group from other segments of society; and (3) a ‘community of interest’ that
the jury pool would not adequately reflect if it expressly excluded members
of the group.”206  Spanish speakers in Puerto Rico share many attributes and
experiences that define and limit their group, namely a common linguistic
experience, which forms a central basis for Puerto Rican identity, and the
economic and educational limitations that not being bilingual in a U.S. terri-
tory presents.  Monolingual Spanish speakers in Puerto Rico are the prevail-
ing group on the island and the embodiment of Puerto Rican culture.  The
social and cultural identity of the Puerto Rican people is rooted in monol-
ingual Spanish.  As such, the absence of monolingual Spanish speakers re-
sults in the absence of not just a “community of interest,” but the dominant
culture, from federal juries.
Examination of the Sixth Amendment implications of the exclusion of
monolingual Spanish speakers in Puerto Rico reveals shortcomings in the
criteria employed to determine whether a group is distinctive for the pur-
poses of the fair-cross-section requirement.  This jurisprudence has been de-
veloped in the context of the states rather than a colonized territory or
commonwealth and presupposes a small minority group discriminated
against by society at large.   Behind this paradigm is an assumption that
persons traditionally discriminated against, such as racial, ethnic, color, or
national origin groups, exist in only small numbers and the bulk of the popu-
lation is from the “majority” (as opposed to “minority”) groups of the com-
munity.  The excluded group is implicitly understood to be a small,
unpopular, or historically disadvantaged minority and thus singled out for
discrimination by the masses.  The case law assumes that the majority is in
power and the minority is subject to that power.  The development of this
model is understandable given the fact that key fair-cross-section cases have
204 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
205 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364) (in-
ternal quotations omitted).
206 Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc); Zuklie, supra note 145, at R
102.
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been developed in the context of protecting racial minorities and, to a lesser
degree, women from impermissible exclusion.
In the case of Puerto Rico this model does not work.  The group subject
to juror exclusion is the majority, albeit a politically disenfranchised major-
ity.  And the population eligible for jury service is the minority.  The result
is that due to the small size and elite composition of the group, the included
group (bilingual Puerto Ricans) appears to be more homogeneous and share
more attributes, attitudes, and experiences amongst themselves than the
masses of excluded monolingual Spanish speakers.  In the context of a colo-
nial-styled government where the majority is ruled by a foreign and distant
imperial power, the ultimate question of whether a group is entitled to fair-
cross-section protection should focus less on distinctiveness measured by
shared attributes, attitudes, ideas, or experiences, but rather on the third fac-
tor: whether the group shares a “community of interest” which the jury pool
would not adequately reflect if the group is systematically excluded.  Here,
the language requirement excludes the interest of not just a community but
the community of Puerto Rico, almost all Puerto Ricans, populations of
color, and people from the lower socioeconomic strata.  Essentially everyone
but the island’s socioeconomic, educational, racial, and ethnic elite are sys-
tematically barred.  In our democracy the exclusion of a minority group is
generally considered abhorrent, as it should be.  But perhaps even more
threatening to democracy is the exclusion of the greater part of a community.
In a political system of majority rule, the prospect of majority disen-
franchisement of a fundamental right should cause great concern.  At its
core, the fair-cross-section requirement serves a democratic “political func-
tion”207 and requires that jury pools be selected from the broader society and
not just a small elite section.208
In Lockhart v. McCree the Supreme Court emphasized that “it [is]
obvious that the concept of ‘distinctiveness’ must be linked to the purposes
of the fair-cross-section requirement.”209  These purposes include:  (1)
“ ‘guard[ing] against the arbitrary exercise of power,’” (2) “ensuring that
the ‘commonsense judgment of the community’” will temper an “‘overzeal-
ous or mistaken prosecutor,’” (3) “preserving ‘public confidence in the fair-
ness of the criminal justice system,’” and (4) “implementing our belief that
‘sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.’” 210
These first two purposes are fundamentally interrelated.  The common-
sense judgment of the community is needed to guard against arbitrary exer-
cise of governmental power, so that the government is not acting as
prosecutor, judge, and jury.211  Here, the exclusion of approximately 90% of
207 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 (1975).
208 ABRAMSON, supra note 142, at 124–25. R
209 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175.
210 Id. at 174–75 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522, 531) (alteration in original) (internal
punctuation omitted).
211 Schulberg, supra note 202, at 25 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530). R
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the population undoubtedly raises a high probability that the composition of
juries is skewed such as to deprive criminal defendants of the commonsense
judgment of the community.  As Justice Marshall explained in Peters v. Kiff:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is ex-
cluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury
room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience
. . . unknown and perhaps unknowable.  It is not necessary to as-
sume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in
order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of
a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected impor-
tance in any case that may be presented.212
The prohibition of monolingual Spanish-speaking Puerto Ricans, the
bulk of the population, removes the dominant experience and culture of the
Puerto Rican people from the jury.  It would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to identify all of the unique “qualities of human nature and vari-
eties of human experience[s]” absent from the jury room when over 90% of
the population is excluded.  The language prerequisite especially eliminates
black Latinos, Puerto Ricans of color, and persons from lower socioeco-
nomic backgrounds from the jury pool.  Individuals from these groups may
have often come from neighborhoods and housing projects where a signifi-
cant amount of federal crimes occur.  Exclusion of both the majority popu-
lace and the less privileged segments of the population deprive the jury from
experiences and perspectives necessary to execute the commonsense judg-
ment of the community.
Under the language requirement, federal juries in Puerto Rico represent
only the socioeconomic, racial and color elite:  a narrow section of the com-
munity.  As the Supreme Court has articulated, “[b]ecause the purpose of
the jury is to guard against arbitrary abuses of power by interposing the
commonsense judgment of the community between the State and the defen-
dant, the jury venire cannot be composed only of special segments of the
population.”213   To prohibit community participation on such a large scale is
contrary to the representational function of the jury and ultimately results in
biased juries.214
Turning to the third purpose of the fair-cross-section requirement, it is
inevitable that the exclusion of most of the population undermines “public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.”215  Reservation of
212 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972).
213 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 314 (1989).
214 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 529 n.7 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1076, at 8 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1797) (“It must be remembered that the jury is designed not only to under-
stand the case, but also to reflect the community’s sense of justice in deciding it.  As long as
there are significant departures from the cross-sectional goal, biased juries are the result—
biased in the sense that they reflect a slanted view of the community they are supposed to
represent.”).
215 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531).
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the privilege of jury service to only a small segment of society of predomi-
nately socioeconomically privileged and lighter-skinned individuals gives
rise to a conspicuous appearance of unfairness that undermines the credibil-
ity of the federal system in the eyes of the populace.  Credibility of the fed-
eral courts is further diminished by the fact that proceedings are not
translated for the public.216
Finally, since resident Puerto Ricans have no federal voting power, jury
service is the only opportunity to participate in self-governance in the federal
system.  Exclusion of most citizens from the privilege of serving on a jury
goes against the fourth purpose of the fair-cross-section requirement to im-
plement our democracy’s belief that “sharing in the administration of justice
is a phase of civic responsibility.”217  Puerto Rico is a remarkably politically
engaged society, which boasts one of the highest voter turnout rates not only
in the Western Hemisphere, but in the world.218  The massive denial of the
right to participate in federal juries is an indignity that reemphasizes the
inferior citizenship status native Puerto Ricans are given upon birth in the
Commonwealth.  These fundamental purposes of the fair-cross-section re-
quirement sustain the conclusion that monolingual Spanish speakers in Pu-
erto Rico are a sufficiently distinctive group in the community.
The second element of a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement under Duren is that the representation of monolingual Spanish
speakers in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable
in relation to the number of such persons in the community.219  Approxi-
mately 90% of the population eighteen years of age or older is composed of
functionally monolingual Spanish speakers.  The qualified jury wheel in-
cludes virtually no monolingual Spanish speakers and any monolingual
Spanish speakers included on this list will be dismissed at the juror orienta-
tion stage.  This is not fair and reasonable because, as discussed in more
detail below, monolingual Spanish speakers could effectively serve with ju-
ror language accommodation.
The final Duren factor is that the “underrepresentation is due to sys-
tematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.”220  Here, under-
representation of monolingual Spanish speakers is due solely to systematic
exclusion posed by the JSSA requirement that potential jurors speak, read,
write, and understand English and the District Court for Puerto Rico’s Jury
Plan.  The other flaw in the jury procedure is that non-English speakers are
216 See Schweers, supra note 74, at 26 (discussing how use of exclusive English in the R
United States District Court for Puerto Rico “is an unpleasant reminder to many of Puerto
Rico’s continued colonial status”).
217 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531).
218 In Puerto Rico voter turnout is over 82%. See Katherine Culliton-González, Time to
Revive Puerto Rican Voting Rights, 19 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 27, 58 (2008); Medina, supra
note 99, at 1074. R
219 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
220 Id.
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not allowed interpreters.  The only objection to these jurors is their deficient
language skills or literacy, which can be remedied through the use of
interpretation.
4. The Federal Government’s Interest in English Language
Proceedings
In Duren, the Supreme Court instructed that the government could
overcome a demonstration of a fair-cross-section violation if “those aspects
of the jury-selection process,” which resulted “in the disproportionate exclu-
sion of a distinctive group,” advanced a significant state interest.221  The
First Circuit in Benmuhar held that even assuming a prima facie case had
been made that the language requirement constituted a fair-cross-section vio-
lation, this was defeated by the government’s interest in holding proceedings
in the national language of English.222  Later, the First Circuit found that the
government was justified in excluding citizens from the jury pool on lan-
guage grounds irrespective of the presence of viable alternatives such as
interpretation.223  The aspects of the jury selection process that exclude jurors
who are not proficient in English and do not permit the use of translation to
allow non-English speakers to serve do not advance the government’s inter-
est in conducting federal court in English.  The government’s interest and the
rights of non-English speakers to serve as jurors with interpretation accom-
modation clearly are not mutually exclusive.
When faced with the prospect of allowing non-English-speaking jurors
to use interpreters, there are likely four primary concerns:  juror reliance on
the translation rather than English testimony or official English translation,
the accuracy of translation, the presence of a thirteenth person during delib-
eration, and the cost of or ability to administer interpretation.  Irrespective of
the strength of these concerns stateside, none of these objections pose seri-
ous obstacles in Puerto Rico, particularly when weighed against the uncon-
stitutional exclusion of up to 90% of the jury-age population.224
In Puerto Rico all the federal judges and most of the counsel are fully
bilingual.225  The defendants in criminal proceedings are usually monol-
ingual Spanish speakers or otherwise do not have sufficient English lan-
guage ability to understand the proceedings.226  Accordingly, most
defendants are provided simultaneous interpretation throughout the proceed-
ings pursuant to their rights under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
221 Id. at 367–68.
222 United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1981).
223 United States v. Dubón-Otero, 292 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2002).
224 Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (holding that cost justifications
are not persuasive when fundamental rights are implicated).
225 Andrea Freeman, Linguistic Colonialism:  Law, Independence, and Language Rights in
Puerto Rico, TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
226 See Pousada, supra note 32, at 140. R
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Clause.227  Testimony of witnesses, except federal officers, is usually in
Spanish.228  If a defendant chooses to testify, his or her testimony is almost
always in Spanish.229  It is a well-known local litigation strategy to have a
witness or party speak in Spanish, even if he or she is fully bilingual, be-
cause it is perceived that the jurors will be more receptive to information
presented in their native language.230  Audio or video recording or correspon-
dence evidence is often in Spanish.  It is a common occurrence for everyone
in the courtroom (from the judge, counsel, defendant, jurors, court staff, and
witnesses) to be fluent in Spanish and hours of Spanish testimony to be
heard, with English used only to dutifully translate the proceedings into an
English record.  As a critic observed:
Use of English [in the United States District Court for Puerto
Rico] is at times absurd, as when attorneys, parties, jurors and the
judge are all native Spanish speakers, and yet all is translated back
and forth between English and Spanish for no other reason than to
comply with a statutory mandate, for no one pays any attention to
the English translations.231
The first apprehension to allowing interpretation is precisely this last
point:  non-English-speaking jurors will not be listening to the English lan-
guage testimony or the official English translation.  The concern is that the
jurors may get a different meaning from the testimony or foreign language
translation since they are not deliberating on the English record.  This con-
cern has gained prominence after the controversial Hernandez v. New York
decision, where the Supreme Court rejected a Batson232 claim that preemp-
tory challenges to exclude Latino jurors on the ground that they were En-
glish-Spanish bilingual and might be guided by Spanish language testimony
over its official translation violated equal protection.233  Hernandez v. New
York has not been applied in Puerto Rico because to do so would potentially
exclude the entire jury pool since essentially every individual in the jury
pool speaks Spanish and every criminal case introduces Spanish language
testimony or other evidence.  Interestingly, the experience of bilingual jurors
in Puerto Rico could be said to have disproven the fears expressed by the
227 Id.
228 Freeman, supra note 226, at 8.
229 Id.
230 Pousada, supra note 32, at 148 (citing M. Gerard-Delfin, Language Under Scrutiny in R
Federal Court, SAN JUAN STAR, Sept. 5, 2002, at 2).
231 Alvarez González, supra note 23, at 373 (quoting Muñiz Argüelles, The Status of Lan- R
guages in Puerto Rico, in CARMELO DELGADO CINTRÓN, EL DEBATE LEGISLATIVO SOBRE LAS
LEYES DEL IDIOMA EN PUERTO RICO 79 (1994)).
232 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).  Under a Batson-styled claim, “[i]f a
defendant can establish a prima facie case of a racially discriminatory peremptory, then the
prosecution must give a reason for the exercise of that peremptory challenge.” NANCY S.
MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 87 (2005).
233 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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Court and the government in Hernandez v. New York.  Bilingual jurors have
served on the federal court there for decades without revealing significant
problems regarding conflicts with the official English record.
The situation of monolingual Spanish speakers is different.  The con-
cern with bilingual jurors is that they will disregard the English translation.
The problem with monolingual Spanish jurors is that they will never mean-
ingfully hear the English testimony, counsel argument, or translation.  They
will rely, and ultimately deliberate, on the original Spanish language testi-
mony, evidence, or translations.  The underlying concern here is essentially
one of accuracy.  If the translations (whether they be to English or Spanish)
are accurate, then there is no problem.  There are three reasons that this is
not an insurmountable obstacle in the District Court for Puerto Rico.  First,
the system there already effectively and accurately translates voluminous
key Spanish language testimony and evidence into English.  Interpretation is
not new to the court, and there is no indication that translation from English
to Spanish will pose any more difficulty than the reverse.234  Criminal de-
fendants currently receive English-to-Spanish interpretation in almost every
case.235  The quality of this interpretation is generally considered sufficient
for Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause purposes.  Thus, it should be
sufficient for jurors.
Second, virtually every officer of the court is fully bilingual and, as
they presently do for Spanish-to-English language translation, will be able to
catch translation errors.  Third, allowing interpretation and translation for
jurors may actually increase accuracy.  Although there has been little com-
plaint about the translation provided to establish an English record, there has
been criticism that jurors sometimes do not have the sufficient English lan-
guage ability to fully understand proceedings.236  If jurors (including bilin-
gual jurors) had access to translation in their native language, the accuracy
of their understanding and deliberations would undoubtedly be enhanced.
Thus, accuracy might be increased overall.
The third objection to allowing jurors to serve with interpretation is the
presence of a thirteenth person during deliberation.  Courts and scholars
have distinguished between allowing interpretation in open court (whether it
be for defendant or juror) and having an outsider enter the inner sanctum of
the jury deliberation room.237  There is substantial support for this practice in
our federal legal system already if one analogizes to the tradition of allowing
certain deaf jurors interpreters to accompany and assist them during deliber-
234 This is not to say that court interpretation is without challenges. See SUSAN BERK-
SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM:  COURT INTERPRETERS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 1–2
(1990) (exploring how “the nature of judicial proceedings is altered when these proceedings
are mediated through the mechanism of a foreign language interpreter”).
235 Freeman, supra note 225, at 8. R
236 See, e.g., United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.
Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1978).
237 See Alice J. Baker, A Model Statute to Provide Foreign-Language Interpreters in the
Ohio Courts, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 593, 611 (1999).
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ations.238  However, this is almost a non-issue in Puerto Rico because jurors
in this jurisdiction deliberate in Spanish.239  This would obviously not change
if monolingual Spanish speakers were permitted to serve.  The prospect of
having an interpreter in the jury room would only arise in the rare (almost
unheard-of) situation of a non-Spanish-speaking person being empanelled.
This event, which would not likely occur for years on end, could be ad-
dressed by providing the Anglophone with an interpreter.
The final objection to allowing juror interpretation is the cost of or abil-
ity to administer an interpretation plan.  There will undoubtedly be increased
costs associated with such a program.  However, the bulk of the infrastruc-
ture needed to accommodate monolingual Spanish speakers is already in
place.  As discussed above, in most cases simultaneous English–to-Spanish
interpretation is already provided by the court to criminal defendants.
Monolingual jurors could simply be given additional headsets to listen to the
translation that is already being provided.240 The hiring of additional court
interpreters will not be without cost.241  Still, this investment is nominal
when compared with remedying the constitutional deprivation of fundamen-
tal rights of up to 90% of the Commonwealth’s adult population—literally
millions of people.
IV. THE LOCAL APPLICABILITY OF THE JUROR LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT
IN PUERTO RICO
Employment of federal statutes in Puerto Rico that conflict with local
Puerto Rican laws and policies have been subject to significant controversy
ever since the establishment of Puerto Rico as a territory.  In recent years,
the debate about the local applicability of federal statutory law under the
Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act242 has centered on the Federal Death Pen-
238 See, e.g., United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding
that the presence of a sign language interpreter for a deaf juror was permissible and did not
pose confidentiality problems, chill or have any “inhibiting influence” on jury deliberations,
or deprive defendant of a fair and impartial trial by jury).
239 Cf. United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 677, 685–86 (1st Cir. 1992) (indicating that
deliberation in Spanish in the United States District Court for Puerto Rico is acceptable and
there is no requirement that jurors deliberate in English).
240 Of course if a defendant needed translation services to speak with his or her counsel, it
may be improper for the same interpreter to provide service to jurors.  However, it is virtually
unheard of that a defendant would have defense counsel that did not speak English.  In this
unlikely instance, separate interpreters could be used.
241 According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of March 2009 language special-
ists in the federal government earned an average annual salary of $79,865. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010–11 EDITION, INTERPRETERS AND
TRANSLATORS, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos175.pdf.  A job posting advertis-
ing a certified court interpreter opening in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico from June 2010 states a starting salary of $88,695 plus a 10.44% cost-of-living
allowance. See U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Career Opportunity Court
Interpreter (English-Spanish) (June 15, 2010), http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/CourtWeb/pdf/Va-
cancy/JA_10_06_Court_Interpreter.pdf.
242 Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 731b–731e (2006).
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alty Act.243  The application of the JSSA English language juror prerequisite
to Puerto Rico presents another opportunity to reconsider the application of
federal statutes to Puerto Rico and to question the current model used to
determine whether a federal statute is “locally inapplicable.”  This Article
proposes a new test and argues that the JSSA language requirement should
be found locally inapplicable to Puerto Rico under Section 9 of the Puerto
Rican Federal Relations Act.244
1. The “Not Locally Inapplicable” Standard
From the inception of Puerto Rico as a territory of the United States and
through the present, the federal government has instructed that federal statu-
tory laws apply with the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as the United
States, but only if these statutes are “not locally inapplicable.”  The original
Organic Act, the Foraker Act of 1900, provided that “the statutory laws of
the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or herein-
after otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in Porto Rico
[sic] as in the United States . . . .”245 This language remained effectively
unaltered in the second Organic Act, the Jones Act of 1917.246
In 1950, Public Law 600 authorized the people of Puerto Rico to adopt
their own constitution and organize a local republican government contain-
ing the fundamental guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights.247  Law 600 was
a bilateral compact between the United States and Puerto Rico, wherein Pu-
erto Rico became a “commonwealth” and was allowed to increase its self-
determination and power to govern local affairs, but still remained subject to
the Territory Clause of the Constitution.248  Public Law 600 repealed numer-
ous provisions of the Jones Act, but retained the “locally inapplicable” lan-
guage of the Act.249  Section 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act
provides:  “The statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable,
except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the
same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States . . . .”250
243 Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–98 (2006); see Ricardo Al-
fonso, The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Puerto Rico:  A Human Rights Crisis in the Path
Towards Self-Determination, 76 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1077, 1089 (2007); Elizabeth Vicens, Note,
Application of the Federal Death Penalty Act to Puerto Rico:  A New Test for the Locally
Inapplicable Standard, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 350, 362 (2005).
244 48 U.S.C. § 734 (2006).
245 Organic Act of 1900 (Foraker Act), ch. 191, § 14, 31 Stat. 77, 80 (1900) (repealed
1917).
246 Organic Act of 1917 (Jones Act), ch. 145, § 44, 39 Stat. 966, 951 (1917) (repealed
1968).
247 48 U.S.C. § 731b (2006).
248 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; 48 U.S.C. § 734 (2006).
249 48 U.S.C. § 734.
250 Id.
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There is no settled rule to determine whether a federal statute is locally
inapplicable to Puerto Rico.251  The lack of a clear test is due, at least in part,
to the fact that in determining the applicability of a given federal statute,
Puerto Rico has not been treated uniformly in terms of its political status.252
For the purposes of some statutes, Puerto Rico has been inconsistently
treated as a state,253 territory,254 or sui generis entity.255  Generally, it has
been accepted that “the character and aim of the statute in question will
determine whether it is locally applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.”256  In other words, the primary issue presented in an analysis of
whether a federal statute applies to Puerto Rico “is whether the matter cov-
ered by the act is one ‘of a legislative character not locally inapplicable.’” 257
The Supreme Court has stated that the grant of power to Puerto Rico over
local matters and the associated “not locally inapplicable” standard “is as
broad and comprehensive as language could make it.”258  Justice Breyer,
while still serving as a circuit judge, observed that “the history of the ‘lo-
cally inapplicable’ language reveals a design to defer to local legislatures in
local matters and an intent to interpret the phrase dynamically . . . . [N]ot
only developing social and economic conditions but also emerging territorial
self-government could render general federal law inapplicable.”259
251 Vicens, supra note 243, at 352–53. R
252 Id. at 363.
253 Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36,
40 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding Puerto Rico is to be treated as a state for purposes of Sherman
Antitrust Act).
254 Alfonso, supra note 243, at 1090; see also Rubén Rodrı́guez Antongiorgi, Review of R
Federal Decisions on the Applicability of United States Laws in Puerto Rico Subsequent to the
Establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 26 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 321, 336 (1956)
(“[T]he new constitution vested in the people of Puerto Rico broader legislative powers than
they had theretofore enjoyed, but it seems clear that the change was not sufficient to make it
necessary to hold that Puerto Rico was no longer a territory within the meaning of that word
. . . .”) (quoting Detres v. Lion Bldg. Corp., 234 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1956)).
255 Alfonso, supra note 244, at 1090–91; Vicens, supra note 243, at 360. R
256 Vicens, supra note 243, at 350–51 (quoting P.R. FED. AFFAIRS ADMIN., DOCUMENTS R
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP OF PUERTO RICO AND THE UNITED STATES 226
(Marcos Ramı́rez Lavandero ed., 3d ed. 1988)).
257 Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 261 (1937).
258 Id.
259 Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36,
43 n.34 (1st Cir. 1981); see also Christina Duffy Burnett, United States:  American Expansion
and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 827 n.131 (2005).  The majority of
challenges asserted under section 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act (“PRFRA”)
during recent times have been rejected. See United States v. Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d 13
(1st Cir. 2001) (reversing the district court’s conclusion that the Federal Death Penalty Act was
locally inapplicable to Puerto Rico under the PRFRA); TAG/ICIB Services, Inc. v. Pan Am.
Grain Co., 215 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that PRFRA did not preclude application of
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act’s statute of limitations in Puerto Rico);
Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos de Puerto Rico, 868 F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that
the PRFRA did not preclude application of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in
Puerto Rico); United States v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1987) (Clean Water Act
applicable in Puerto Rico); Caribtow Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Com’n, 493
F.2d 1064, 1065–68 & nn. 2–10 (1st Cir. 1974) (Occupational Safety and Health Act applica-
ble in Puerto Rico), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); NLRB v. Security Nat. Life Ins. Co.,
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It is clear from the plain language of the statute that federal law applies
unless it is inappropriate under local law.260  This is how the statute was
originally understood.  The statutory language is not unique to Puerto Rico.
Other territories of the United States were subject to this same provision in
their organic acts.261  The “not locally inapplicable” provision was originally
introduced by politicians from southern states as an effort to exempt New
Mexico and other new territories from any federal prohibition against slav-
ery.262  Thus, under the proviso as originally intended, New Mexico would
have been exempt from any federal abolition or ban on slavery if New Mex-
ico chose to permit slavery.263
In adopting this language into the Foraker Act, the drafters recognized
that occasions would arise where local laws and policies would conflict with
federal law, such that the federal law should be rendered inapplicable to
Puerto Rico.
Senator Foraker, in [crafting the Foraker Act of] 1900, deliber-
ately chose this model (rather than following the simpler Wiscon-
sin territorial act model—“so far as . . . may be applicable”).  His
choice reflects, if anything, a more, rather than less, deferential
494 F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1974) (National Labor Relations Act applies in Puerto Rico because the
statute was not in conflict with the Puerto Rican Labor Relations Act); Moreno Rios v. United
States, 256 F.2d 68, 71–73 (1st Cir. 1958) (Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act applicable in
Puerto Rico).  However, some section 9 challenges have been successful, albeit in narrow
instances and applications. See Cordova, 649 F.2d at 37 (Section 3 of Sherman Act forbidding
agreements “in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States” did not
apply to Puerto Rico); Liquilux Gas Services of Ponce, Inc. v. Tropical Gas Co., 303 F. Supp.
414 (D.P.R. 1969) (holding Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable to local Puerto Rican transac-
tions); Trigo Bros. Packing Corp. v. Davis, 159 F. Supp. 841 (D.P.R. 1958) (holding provi-
sions of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act not applicable to Puerto Rico for domestically
bottled and distributed products); United States v. Figueroa Rios, 140 F. Supp. 376 (D.P.R.
1956) (holding the Firearms Act is inapplicable to commerce within Puerto Rico); cf. Guerrido
v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 234 F.2d 349, 355 (1st Cir. 1956) (“[T]he rules of admiralty and
maritime law of the United States are presently in force in the navigable waters of the United
States in and around the island of Puerto Rico to the extent that they are not locally inapplica-
ble either because they were not designed to apply to Puerto Rican waters or because they have
been rendered inapplicable to these waters by inconsistent Puerto Rican legislation.”).
260 See Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d at 156 (“To be ‘locally inapplicable,’ the Puerto Rican
legislation must be incompatible with or specifically exclusive of the federal legislation it
seeks to supplant.”).
261 See, e.g., Organic Act for the Territory of Alaska, Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 387, § 3, 37 Stat.
512.
262 Alfonso, supra note 243, at 1089 (quoting Cordova, 649 F.2d at 43 n.34); see Compro- R
mise of 1850 (Texas and New Mexico), Pub. L. No. 111-137, 9 Stat. 446, 452 (“[T]he Consti-
tution, and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same
force and effect within the said Territory of New Mexico as elsewhere within the United
States.”); see also HOLMAN HAMILTON, PROLOGUE TO CONFLICT: THE CRISIS AND COMPRO-
MISE OF 1850 144–46 (1964) (discussing Senator Cass’s “Nicholson” letter, in which he ex-
pressed his view that the territories should be able to manage their own internal affairs).
263 CONG. GLOBE, 31ST CONG., 1ST SESS. 436–39, 508–10, 570–73, 592, 902, 911, 944–48
(1850) (tracking the congressional debate on the controversial admission of new territories
which would either be admitted as free states to bolster the Northern vote or slave-holding
states to bolster the Southern vote).
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view of the effect of local social, economic and legislative devel-
opments on general federal law.264
The establishment of Puerto Rico as a commonwealth made this defer-
ence to local law under the “locally inapplicable” standard even more sali-
ent.265  The Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act was a bilateral compact
between Congress and the people of Puerto Rico, which transformed Puerto
Rico from a territory to a commonwealth with significantly enhanced pow-
ers of self-government and autonomy.266  The requirement that federal stat-
utes only apply to Puerto Rico if they are “not locally inapplicable” took on
increased significance and “vitality” when it was placed in Section 9 of the
Federal Relations Act.267  At the time of its enactment, the Puerto Rican Fed-
eral Relations Act was understood as rendering “federal legislation, both
existing and prospective . . . not applicable to Puerto Rico where local condi-
tions would make this undesirable.”268
The applicability of federal statutes was initially questioned under sec-
tion 9 even where the statute mentioned Puerto Rico or had been previously
applied to Puerto Rico before becoming a commonwealth.269  However, in
more recent times, the First Circuit has moved away from the plain meaning
and its own, as well as the Supreme Court’s, earlier interpretation of the “not
locally inapplicable” standard.  This line of interpretation focuses almost ex-
clusively on congressional intent to apply a given statute to Puerto Rico.  “If
Congress has made clear its intent that a federal statute apply to Puerto Rico,
then the issue of whether a law is otherwise ‘locally inapplicable’ does not,
by definition, arise.”270  This construction ignores the original meaning as
provided by the framers of the Organic Acts.  Even more significantly, the
interpretation overlooks the Federal Relations Act drafters’ meaning and the
264 Cordova, 649 F.2d at 44 n.34.
265 Liquilux Gas Services of Ponce, Inc. v. Tropical Gas Co., 303 F. Supp. 414, 419
(D.P.R. 1969) (“While the wording of section 9 did not change from its original wording, that
section clearly took on important new meaning in 1952.”).
266 Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (“[F]ully recognizing
the principle of government by consent this Act is now adopted in the nature of a compact so
that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their
own adoption.”); see also Lebowitz, supra note 62, at 222–23. R
267 United States v. Rios, 140 F. Supp. 376, 381–82 (D.P.R. 1956).  Prior to Puerto Rico’s
establishment as a commonwealth, its legislature and legislative procedures were dictated by
Congress, making its government “mere agencies of the Congress.” Id. at 380.  However,
after its establishment as a commonwealth, the people of Puerto Rico chose their government,
and that government did not have to report to Congress or the president for supervision. Id. at
380–81. The vast difference over Puerto Rico’s power of self-governance after its establish-
ment as a commonwealth made “the Commonwealth legislature and governor reign supreme
over all matters of local concern.” Id. at 381.
268 Leibowitz, supra note 63, at 219. R
269 Id. at 237.
270 United States v. Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding the Federal
Death Penalty Act applies in Puerto Rico despite the fact that Puerto Rico has a constitutional
ban on the death penalty).
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fact that Puerto Rico’s language, as well as political and legal institutional
cultures, may render certain applications of federal law locally inapplicable.
2. A New Test to Determine the Local Applicability of Federal
Statutes to Puerto Rico
Since the enactment of the Federal Relations Act, scholars have persua-
sively challenged the inconsistent interpretation of the “not locally inappli-
cable” standard and posed alternative models of statutory construction that
are more consistent with the statute’s original intent.  This scholarship has
experienced a re-emergence in the aftermath of the controversial First Cir-
cuit decision in United States v. Acosta-Martinez, which applied the Federal
Death Penalty Act to Puerto Rico despite the fact that the Act did not men-
tion Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rican Constitution explicitly forbids271 the
death penalty.272  For instance, in an exceptional student note, Elizabeth
Vicens proposes an alternative paradigm of statutory interpretation “where
the statute on its face is either ambiguous or silent with respect to whether it
applies to Puerto Rico, and where a strong local interest is implicated, there
should be a rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend the statute
to apply to Puerto Rico.”273
One of the most notable proposed models of interpretation of section 9
is by Arnold Leibowitz, U.S. territorial relations scholar and former General
Counsel of the United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Pu-
erto Rico.  He has long recommended:
[W]here Congress has indicated the desire to cover intra-Puerto
Rico transactions or has used general language to indicate that all
areas within the United States are to be covered and the Act also
covers intra-State transactions, then section 9 should not come into
play unless the party seeking to interpose it makes a reviewable
record of the facts not brought to the attention of Congress demon-
strating local conditions are such that federal law should not be
applied.274
In other words, under the Leibowitz paradigm, irrespective of congressional
intent that a given federal statute applies to Puerto Rico, the local applicabil-
ity of a federal statute could be challenged when the moving party can
demonstrate facts concerning local conditions that Congress did not
consider.
Examination of application of the JSSA language requirement to Puerto
Rico reveals potential shortcomings of these tests.  A limitation of Vicen’s
271 P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7 (“The right to life, liberty and the enjoyment of property is
recognized as a fundamental right of man.  The death penalty shall not exist.”).
272 Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d at 21.
273 Vicens, supra note 243, at 367. R
274 Leibowitz, supra note 63, at 238. R
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proposed test is that it does not apply to situations where the statute men-
tions Puerto Rico, but where Congress did not consider the local implica-
tions of its legislation.  Leibowitz’s test takes such instances into account,
but might be interpreted as overly broad.  For instance, under the Leibowitz
proposal a challenge could be made where the federal conflict with local law
is relatively insignificant.  This might result in excessive litigation over in-
consequential differences between federal and commonwealth laws.
Building upon the proposals of Leibowitz and Vicens and with the orig-
inal purpose of the “not locally inapplicable” standard firmly in mind, I
propose a new test to determine the local applicability of federal statutes to
Puerto Rico:
(1) If Congress does not explicitly state that a statute applies to
Puerto Rico then it should be deemed not locally applicable to
Puerto Rico.275
(2) If the statute explicitly states that it applies to Puerto Rico, a
challenge can be made under section 9 of the Puerto Rican
Federal Relations Act, but only under limited circumstances.
A moving party can make a prima facie case by showing that:
(a) application of the federal statute would likely result in the
deprivation of constitutional rights under either the federal
or Commonwealth constitutions; and
(b) Congress did not consider reviewable facts which provide
the basis for the constitutional deprivation.
If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, then a rebuttable presumption
arises that the statute is not locally applicable to Puerto Rico.  The govern-
ment could, in turn, satisfy its burden by demonstrating either that Congress
considered the facts at issue or that the alleged constitutional deprivation is
not likely to occur if the federal statute is applied to Puerto Rico.276
This proposed test seeks to ensure that when Congress intends a statute
to apply to Puerto Rico, it will make a clear statement indicating this after
considering the unique local implications imposed by the law.  By limiting
challenges to only those federal statutes that are likely to result in a constitu-
tional violation (rather than all statutes that conflict with commonwealth
law) the test will ensure that judicial exception of Puerto Rico from federal
legislation will be infrequent.277  However, in cases that implicate the most
important rights, courts will be able to inquire into whether Congress consid-
275 I would propose that this apply retroactively.
276 Congress could of course anticipate and forestall litigation by sufficiently considering
the local impact of federal statutes in Puerto Rico.
277 See Leibowitz, supra note 63, at 238–39 (expressing the importance of infrequent judi- R
cial exception under section 9 of the Federal Relations Act because of “the need for certainty
of coverage of federal law without judicial interpretation, but also because judicial interpreta-
tion is slow and limited to a given situation”).
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ered the manner in which the statute contradicts important local interests and
conditions.
Possible lines of criticism of this proposal include fears that it might
disregard the Supremacy Clause,278 violate the separation of powers, and un-
duly give more preferable treatment to Puerto Rico than the states.  Though
these concerns raise important issues, they are ultimately unfounded.  This
proposal does not undermine the federal preemption doctrine.  Under the
proposal, federal law is still the “law of the land,” even in Puerto Rico.
However, if Congress wants a statute to apply to Puerto Rico it must explic-
itly specify this in the statutory language and sufficiently consider the fed-
eral and commonwealth constitutional implications, and in turn the local
appropriateness, of applying the law to Puerto Rico.  In cases where a fed-
eral statute is found inapplicable to Puerto Rico, it would be due to federal
law (the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act) limiting the reach of the stat-
ute.  Thus, the Supremacy Clause would not be implicated.
A possible criticism is that in certain situations the proposal violates
separation of powers by allowing courts to make factual findings to supple-
ment those of Congress and to effectively overrule Congress’ intention that a
statute applies to Puerto Rico.  Ultimately this concern is unwarranted.
Under the proposal, Congress remains free to legislate over Puerto Rico as it
sees fit.  However, Congress must make their intent that a statue applies to
Puerto Rico unambiguous and consider the local impact of a given federal
statute.  When Congress fails to make their intent clear and consider the
local implications of legislation that likely poses a federal or local constitu-
tional violation, the courts can then be called upon to ensure that section 9 of
the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act is enforced.  This is consistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers because it provides much needed checks
and balances on Congressional power.  Moreover, protecting under-
represented groups is a core function of the judiciary, and under the proposal
set forth here the courts would not be trampling on the prerogative and insti-
tutional competence of the legislature.279
At first glance it may appear that this additional burden of inquiry into
the local constitutional consequences of a federal statute puts Puerto Rico in
a more privileged position than the states.  Congress would not be obligated
to specifically articulate its intent for a federal statute to apply to a certain
state or consider the local effects of a federal statute for a given state.  How-
ever, any concern that the states would be treated less favorably than Puerto
Rico ignores political reality.  The states have political representation, while
278 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
279 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 (1980).
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Puerto Rico does not.  Congress is already accountable to the states, but not
to Puerto Rico.280
Under current First Circuit jurisprudence, the legislative intent needed
to find that a federal statute applies to Puerto Rico is interpreted broadly.  A
statute need not mention Puerto Rico or territorial application, but can sim-
ply be related to another statute that applies to Puerto Rico.281  This should
not be considered adequate under the compact between Congress and the
people of Puerto Rico that federal statutory laws have the same force and
effect in Puerto Rico as in the states so long as the statutes are “not locally
inapplicable.”  Additional consideration for the local applicability of federal
statutes is also warranted because Puerto Rico is unique within our federal
system.  Puerto Rico is not a state and does not have meaningful or effective
representation in Congress.  As discussed in Part II, there is no constituency
base to ensure that the interests of the people of Puerto Rico are taken into
consideration in enacting the laws which govern Puerto Ricans.  A require-
ment that Congress explicitly declare its intention that a given statute applies
to Puerto Rico and consider the local impact of its implementation is consis-
tent with section 9 of the Federal Relations Act. Moreover, such an obliga-
tion would act as a safeguard for the rights of residents of Puerto Rico who
are subject to the powers of Congress but lack representation.
3. The Local Inapplicability of the Language Requirement
The application of the JSSA English juror prerequisite in Puerto Rico
presents an example of the impropriety of imposing federal laws on Puerto
Rico that are inapposite to local law and made without adequate considera-
tion of local repercussions.  The requirement that all potential jurors read,
write, speak, and understand English is in direct conflict with local legisla-
tion, policies, and interests, and it results in a deprivation of constitutional
rights.  As mentioned above, the delineation of Spanish as the language of
Puerto Rico appears in several locations in Puerto Rican law.  Although both
Spanish and English are official languages, Puerto Rico operates in monol-
ingual Spanish in almost all areas of public and private life, the primary
exceptions being the federal court and elite private primary and secondary
schools.  All three major political parties have taken a unified stance—a rare
point of consensus—that Spanish is the language of public affairs and public
participation.282  All branches of the Puerto Rican government—the Execu-
tive, Legislature, and Judiciary—have taken strong and consistent positions
280 The denial of this fundamental Sixth Amendment right set within the backdrop of polit-
ical powerlessness is precisely the sort of constitutional deprivation that should be subject to
“more searching judicial inquiry.” Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
281 See United States v. Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding the
Federal Death Penalty Act applicable in Puerto Rico even though the Act’s statutory language
was silent about the localities in which it applied because the substantive criminal statutes
charged against the defendants contain punishment provisions that include the death penalty).
282 See Pousada, supra note 32, at 138. R
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defending Spanish as the language of government, business, culture, public
affairs, and ultimately, the law of the land.283  This espousal is most impas-
sioned in the spheres of the courts and public education.
As discussed above, the medium of the public education curriculum in
Puerto Rico is Spanish, except for limited second or foreign language
courses in English.  It is well recognized both in the United States and Pu-
erto Rico that schools, and particularly public schools, are intended to instill
democratic values in youth and prepare them for active and responsible par-
ticipation as citizens in their communities.  Perhaps no privilege or responsi-
bility of citizenship, aside from voting, is as celebrated as jury duty.284  In
Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth government has chosen to prepare its popu-
lace for citizenship and public participation by means of the Spanish lan-
guage.  The Puerto Rican government’s mandate that the medium of public
education be Spanish without meaningful English preparation is in signifi-
cant tension with the requirement that federal jurors be proficient in English.
The conflict between the JSSA language requirement and local Puerto
Rican law is further demonstrated by the commonwealth law requiring that
its courts operate exclusively in Spanish.  In the locally celebrated and re-
nowned 1965 case, People v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico rejected a motion under the 1902 Language Act for a trial in English,
holding that the courts of Puerto Rico must only use Spanish because “the
language of the Puerto Rican people . . . has been and continues to be Span-
ish . . . and that is a reality that cannot be changed by any law.”285
The 1993 Language Act provides that both Spanish and English are the
official languages of Puerto Rico and can be used indistinctively, but transla-
tion must be made when necessary for interested parties to understand a
governmental proceeding.286  Excluding non-English speakers from the fed-
eral courts without allowing interpretation or translation for these individuals
is incompatible with this law.
The provision stating that federal statutes apply to Puerto Rico unless
they are locally inapplicable was enacted to ensure that federal law, when
wholly incompatible with local law, policy, and circumstance, would not
apply to Puerto Rico.  This is precisely that type of situation.  The local law
declaring Spanish the language of the people, government, courts, education,
and citizenry, combined with the requirement that judicial and other public
proceedings conducted in English must be translated into Spanish, makes the
JSSA requirement inapplicable.  Under the original and clear purpose of the
“not locally inapplicable” standard, it is apparent that local law is entirely
283 People v. Superior Court, 92 P.R. 580, 589–90 (1965); Alvarez González, supra note
23, at 369 n.52. R
284 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“Indeed, with the exception of voting,
for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to
participate in the democratic process.”).
285 Superior Court, 92 P.R. at 588–89.
286 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1, §§ 51, 59, 59(a) (2009).
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incompatible with the JSSA English language juror requirement.  As ex-
plored below, allowing Puerto Rico to opt out of the JSSA English juror
prerequisite will not defeat the federal government’s interest in conducting
proceedings in English and preserving an English language record for appeal
because non-English speakers can be accommodated through language inter-
pretation and translation.  Further, allowing Puerto Rico to opt out of the
JSSA requirement would actually further the core purposes of the JSSA that
juries be derived from a fair cross section of the community and that citizens
not be excluded from service on the basis of race, color, national origin, or
economic status.287
However, under the current and prevailing jurisprudential framework, it
is unlikely that a court would find an exception for Puerto Rico under sec-
tion 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act.  Although section 1865
(the JSSA English language prerequisite proviso) itself does not mention
Puerto Rico, one section of the broader statute does.  Section 1863(b)(2)
provides an exception for Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone, stating that these
jurisdictions may compile potential juror lists from other sources than voter
registrars.288  In the U.S. House Report on the JSSA, the House determined
that the jury plan for Puerto Rico “may prescribe sources other than voter
lists since  . . . the voter lists would contain many names of persons not
literate in English and therefore not qualified for jury service.”289  Further,
the Federal Relations Act’s provision containing requirements for jury ser-
vice (including the prerequisite that jurors speak English) was repealed on
the date that the JSSA went into effect.290  Under current jurisprudence, this
statutory reference, legislative history, and coinciding congressional action
would likely serve as sufficient indication that Congress intended for the
JSSA to apply to Puerto Rico and render the issue outside the purview of
section 9 of the Federal Relations Act.
Applying the new proposed test set forth in this Article, a challenge
could be successfully asserted under section 9 that application of the JSSA
language requirement is not locally applicable.  As discussed above, it is
likely that employment of this statutory provision deprives a sizable portion
of the population of Puerto Rico of their fundamental Sixth Amendment
right to a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community.  Thus,
application of this provision of the statute violates the federal Constitution.
Moreover, reviewing the JSSA text and legislative history illustrates that
Congress did not consider the fact that the language requirement results in
the exclusion of over 90% of the age-eligible population from jury service
287 28 U.S.C. §§ 1862, 1863(b)(3) (2006).
288 Id. § 1863(b)(2).
289 H.R. REP. No. 90-1076, at 1800 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1800.
290 48 U.S.C. § 867 (repealed 1968 pursuant to effective date of 28 U.S.C. § 1861).
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and defeats the core anti-discrimination and fair-cross-section purposes of
the JSSA.291
Irrespective of whether courts continue to follow the Acosta-Martinez
line of interpreting the “not locally inapplicable” standard, Congress should
amend the JSSA to make the English language juror prerequisite inapplica-
ble to Puerto Rico.  Exceptions for Puerto Rico in the JSSA are not unprece-
dented.  As stated above, the only place in the JSSA that explicitly mentions
Puerto Rico excuses Puerto Rico from the requirement that voter lists be
used to select the names of prospective jurors.292  Congress has the ability to
exempt Puerto Rico from the English language juror prerequisite.  For better
or worse, it is well-accepted that Congress acting pursuant to its plenary
power over Puerto Rico under the Territory Clause of the United States Con-
stitution “may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a
rational basis for its actions.”293  The fact that 90% of the population of Pu-
erto Rico does not have sufficient English proficiency to serve as jurors
alone would support a rational (if not compelling) basis to exempt Puerto
Rico from the language requirement.  Not to mention the fact that over-rep-
resentational omission of certain racial, ethnic, color, and economic popula-
tions is at odds with the policies behind the JSSA.294
Congress and the courts have been quick to acknowledge that Puerto
Rico’s territorial or commonwealth status permits different treatment from
that of states, as long as a rational basis justifies the difference.  But the
resultant different treatment of Puerto Ricans has customarily amounted to
detrimental treatment, such as limited application of constitutional protec-
tions,295 denial of supplemental security income benefits for the aged and
disabled if they reside in Puerto Rico,296 or lower levels of aid to Puerto
Rican families with dependent children under federal welfare programs297
when compared to state-side residents.  Congress has determined that U.S.
291 The legislative history shows that Congress was aware that utilization of voter registers
for a source of names for the jury list would include many names of individuals who do not
speak English and thus are ineligible for jury service. H.R. REP. No. 90-1076 at 1800.  Never-
theless, there is no evidence that Congress considered the extent of this exclusion and its
disproportional exclusion of groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, education, and economic
status.
292 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2).
293 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980). But see id. at 653–56 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Court’s supposition that “Congress needs only a rational basis to
support less beneficial treatment for Puerto Rico, and the citizens residing there . . . . from
discriminatory legislation, as long as Congress acts pursuant to the Territory Clause” is not
supported by any authority).
294 28 U.S.C. § 1862.
295 See supra Part II, discussing the Insular Cases.
296 Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam) (holding revocation of indi-
viduals’ supplemental security income benefits when they moved from the states to Puerto
Rico was proper and did not violate the right of interstate travel under the Fifth Amendment).
297 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (per curiam) (holding lower level of aid under
the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program to Puerto Ricans did not violate
the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee).
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citizens deserve less protection under the Constitution or fewer social ser-
vices simply because they reside in Puerto Rico.  It is difficult to understand
why place of residence has warranted such different treatment of U.S. citi-
zens.298  However, in the case of the language of Puerto Rican residents,
there is a genuine difference.  The deferential treatment of allowing Puerto
Ricans to serve as jurors irrespective of their English language ability is
warranted and necessary to allow equal access to the courts and achieve the
central cross-sectional and non-discrimination tenets of the JSSA.
V. SOLUTION: LANGUAGE ACCOMMODATION FOR NON-ENGLISH-
SPEAKING JURORS
This Article proposes that otherwise qualified monolingual Spanish
speakers be permitted to serve on federal juries with the assistance of inter-
preters,299 building upon the extensive interpretation and translation services
already in place in the federal court.  For example, the current infrastructure
of simultaneous English-to-Spanish translation already provided to most de-
fendants in criminal proceedings pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment could be expanded to provide interpretation to jurors.
Jury service has not always been reserved for English speakers.  In de-
termining whether non-English speakers should be allowed to serve as fed-
eral jurors with language interpretation accommodation, we need not look
for models beyond the U.S. legal system.  Our legal system has multiple
examples, both historical and current, where non-English speakers have
served and currently do serve as jurors through the accommodation of inter-
pretation.  After the United States acquired the southwestern territories from
Mexico through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 and Sale of La
Mesilla in 1853 until the early 20th century, monolingual Spanish speakers
often served as jurors with the assistance of interpreters in the southwestern
states.300  The reasons for allowing monolingual Spanish speakers to serve on
298 See Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v. Rullan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.P.R. 2008)
(criticizing the decisions in Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978), and Harris v. Rosa-
rio, 446 U.S. 651 (1980)); see also Harris, 446 U.S. at 652–56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (ques-
tioning the Court’s decision that heightened scrutiny is “unavailable to protect Puerto Rico . . .
from discriminatory legislation, so long as Congress acts pursuant to the Territory Clause”).
299 The other obvious alternative is to conduct proceedings in Spanish.  The argument for
Spanish language proceedings has been articulately advanced by Professor Alicia Pousada and
need not be reiterated here.  Pousada, supra note 32, at 146–49 (arguing that prevailing notions R
of international human rights law demonstrate that Spanish should be the operating language
of the federal court).  Ultimately, this is a political issue, one that this Article expresses no
opinion about.  Rather, for the purpose of this Article, it is presupposed that the U.S. govern-
ment has a significant state interest in operating its courts in English and offers a pragmatic
solution to the juror-exclusion predicament that would fit within this framework.
300 Laura E. Gómez, Race, Colonialism, and Criminal Law:  Mexicans and the American
Criminal Justice System in Territorial New Mexico, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1129, 1166,
1172–73 (2000); Douglas A. Kibbee, Minority Language Rights:  Historical and Comparative
Perspectives, 3 INTERCULT. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 79, 90 (2008); Colin A. Kisor, Using Interpret-
ers to Assist Jurors:  A Plea for Consistency, 22 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 37, 41–43 (2001);
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juries at that time justify the practice in Puerto Rico.  These lands were ac-
quired by treaty from Spanish-speaking nations, the language of the people
was predominately Spanish, and without allowing Spanish speakers to serve
the potential jury pool was too small.301
More recently, and in the context of both state and federal courts, the
reasoning warranting interpretation for deaf jurors also supports interpreta-
tion for non-English speakers.  Historically, deaf persons were excluded
from juries because, like non-English speakers, they lacked the requisite lan-
guage skills but were otherwise qualified to serve.302  Some courts recog-
nized the injustice in this prohibition and permitted deaf citizens to serve
with the assistance of sign language translators.  Later, Congress acted, ef-
fectively prohibiting discrimination of deaf persons from juries in both the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973303 and the Americans with Disabilities Act304 of
1990.305
The most striking model for allowing non-English speakers to serve as
jurors is the time-proven practice in the New Mexico state courts.  Ever
since New Mexico was a territory it “has encouraged participation of non-
English speakers, particularly Spanish-speaking citizens, in its jury sys-
tem.”306  This practice arose out of necessity since “in certain counties the
English speaking citizens possessing the qualifications of jurors could be
counted by tens instead of hundreds . . . ,”307 as well as a sense of fundamen-
tal fairness, which recognized that Spanish was a dominant language of the
people.  In 1911, the common law practice of allowing non-English speakers
to serve on juries was made a constitutional right.  Article VII of the New
Mexico Constitution provides, in relevant part:
The right of any citizen of the state to vote, hold office or sit upon
juries, shall never be restricted, abridged or impaired on account of
religion, race, language or color, or inability to speak, read or write
see, e.g., Town of Trinidad v. Simpson, 5 Colo. 65, 68 (1879) (holding it was “fully within the
power of the court to appoint an interpreter . . . to interpret the testimony of witnesses and
arguments of counsel” for a non-English-speaking juror).
301 There are concerns that the United States District Court for Puerto Rico’s jury pool is
too small, not only in terms of its lack of representativeness, but in actual size.  Due to the
limited number of citizens who meet the language requirement, some jurors consecutively sit
on multiple juries, creating a phenomenon of repeat or “career jurors.”
302 Kisor, supra note 300, at 38.  The analogy here is not about accommodation for disa- R
bility or alterableness, but rather that the two groups may lack spoken English language liter-
acy and may be able to serve as jurors with interpretation.
303 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).
304 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
305 See Kibbee, supra note 300, at 91 n.35; Kisor, supra note 300, at 39. R
306 Edward L. Chávez, New Mexico’s Success with Non-English Speaking Jurors, 1 J. CT.
INNOVATION 303, 303 (Fall 2008).
307 Id. at 305 (quoting Territory of New Mexico v. Romine, 2 N.M. 114, 123 (1881) (inter-
nal punctuation omitted)).
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the English or Spanish languages except as may be otherwise pro-
vided in this constitution.308
New Mexico state courts have successfully allowed Spanish-speaking309 ju-
rors to participate in juries since the 1860s, longer than Puerto Rico has been
a U.S. territory.
In New Mexico courts, interpretation services are provided to non-En-
glish-speaking jurors by certified court interpreters during all phases of
trial.310  The court maintains half a dozen court staff interpreters and then
contracts with many private practice interpreters.311  The interpreter provides
simultaneous and consecutive interpretation, as well as written translation.312
The New Mexico state courts have established detailed Non-English-Speak-
ing Juror Guidelines, which provide practical guidance for instituting a pro-
gram allowing service by non-English-speaking jurors.313  Participants in
court proceedings are informed of the function of interpreters through vari-
ous means.  The New Mexico courts have a model jury instruction used to
explain the role and professional requirements of the court interpreter.314
The court interpreter also takes an oath in open court “that he or she will
only provide translation services to the non-English-speaking juror and will
not otherwise participate in the trial or jury deliberations.”315
Non-English speaking jurors have reported positive experiences with
their jury service, and onlookers have commented that “it is rather anti-
climatic to observe a trial with non-English-speaking jurors because it is
actually not very different from a jury trial with all English-speaking ju-
rors.”316  “Once the judge and the court staff have received intensive train-
ing, the system operates as smoothly as it does when there are no non-
English-speaking jurors.”317 Inspired by the successful employment of non-
English speakers on juries in New Mexico, Chief Judge Edward L. Chávez,
of the New Mexico Supreme Court, encourages other jurisdictions to follow
suit.  In his words:  “Not only should our non-English-speaking citizens en-
joy the privileges of citizenship, they should share in the responsibilities.”318
“All adult citizens should participate [in jury service], because above all,
justice requires an unapologetic and undaunted courage to exercise one’s
308 N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
309 See Chávez, supra note 306, at 308 (Spanish speakers represent approximately 57% of R
the non-English-speaking jurors requiring interpreters in the jurisdiction.  The court has pro-
vided interpretation in dozens of other languages over the years).
310 Id. at 309.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 317 (Appendix A provides a copy of the Guidelines).
314 Id. at 308.
315 Id.
316 Id. at 310.
317 Id. at 311.
318 Id. at 316.
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moral genius.  All people, no matter their station in life or their ability to
speak and understand the English language have that moral genius.”319
The use of interpreters for non-English-speaking jurors works in the
state courts of New Mexico, and it can work in the federal court of Puerto
Rico.
CONCLUSION
The power of criminal juries is unparalleled in our society.  Through
jury service, citizens are bestowed with the privilege of direct participation
in self-government and the awe-inspiring responsibility of determining the
innocence or guilt of an individual tried for a crime.  Across from the jury
box, criminal defendants are guaranteed the fundamental constitutional right
to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.  But not in the
federal court in Puerto Rico.
Due to the English language juror prerequisite, over 90% of the other-
wise-eligible population is excluded and essentially only an elite unrepre-
sentative minority is allowed to serve as federal jurors.  The people of Puerto
Rico are subject to the federal government but lack any way to meaningfully
participate in it as jurors or voters.  Justice under the Sixth Amendment has
been denied by the federal government to the people of Puerto Rico for over
a century.  This injustice should not be allowed to continue in the federal
court, particularly when all that stands in the way is an interpretation pro-
gram, the likes of which has already been successfully employed in the
American legal system.
The problem of juror exclusion in Puerto Rico is not merely a Puerto
Rican problem:  it is an American problem.  Examination of this dilemma
reveals inequities in our federal court system and shortcomings in our consti-
tutional fair-cross-section jurisprudence.  This inquiry also exposes the con-
tinuing effects of American imperialism and its concomitant xenophobia and
racism, as well as the necessity for legislative and judicial action to rectify
the legacy of U.S. colonialism.  It demonstrates the critical need for a new
assessment to determine the local applicability of federal statutes in Puerto
Rico, such as the test proposed in this Article.  Ultimately, it challenges us to
renounce the second-class status of non-English-speaking citizens, not only
in Puerto Rico but throughout the United States, and to implement a policy
of juror language accommodation to ensure the preservation of Sixth
Amendment rights for all persons.
319 Id. at 304.
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